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I. INTRODUCTION
Changes in the scope of intellectual property ("IP") legal rights
are generally thought to be linked to changes in positive law. IP laws
grant private parties the right to control certain types of information
(e.g., books in copyright). Lawmakers set the scope of these rights by
allowing control over some uses of IP goods but not others. They
also set rights at a particular strength: strong enough to mitigate the
economic problems that animate IP law, but deliberately bounded in
light of social costs arising from excessive control over information.
1. "Positive law" in this sense refers to statutes, case law holdings, and other explicitly
promulgated laws fixed in authoritative legal texts. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1280 (9th ed. 2009) ("Positive law typically consists of enacted law - the codes, statutes,
and regulations that are applied and enforced in the courts.").
2. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting copyright owners, among other rights, the
right to reproduce copyrighted works); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (granting
patentees the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling in the United States
inventions covered by a patent claim).
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The Copyright Act, for example, allows private parties to control cer-
tain uses of information (e. ., the copying of books) but not others
(e.g., control over criticism). An increase or decrease in legal scope is
usually thought to occur by an explicit change in statute or case law. 4
This Article argues that shifts in the scope of IP laws are often
driven by changes in technological feasibility and not by changes in
positive law. To understand this argument, consider how activities
important to IP law can be implicitly constrained by technological
limitations and how this constraint can influence positive IP law. The
unauthorized copying of creative works by third parties is a core con-
cern of copyright law, as such copying can diminish the value that an
author can appropriate. However, throughout much of the twentieth
century, federal copyright law did not protect sound recordings (e.g.,
music albums) from duplication.5 This was a notable omission be-
cause during this same period federal copyright law did include ex-
plicit protection for many other types of creative works, including
books, sheet music, etc.6
In part, the absence of federal copyright protection was due to the
limited state of copying technology for sound recordings in that era.
For most of the early twentieth century, third-party copying of sound
recordings was technologically difficult. Creating copies required ac-
cess to both tightly controlled, physically distant "master records" and
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-07; Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html (describing criticism as fair use) (last visited Dec.
20, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 585, 586-87 (2011).
5. See PETER JASZI & NICK LEWIS, PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS
UNDER STATE LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON USE BY NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: A 10-STATE
ANALYSIS 2-4 (2009). Although sound recordings had no federal copyright protection prior
to 1972, the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings was prohibited under a variety of
state laws. Id. at 4. However, most states did not statutorily prohibit unauthorized duplica-
tion until the late 1960s, leaving the first half of the twentieth century with weak legal pro-
tection for sound recordings. See id. at 2-4.
6. See, Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1985) (dis-
cussing scope ofCopyright Act of 1870).
7. The technological difficulty of copying was not the only reason that sound recordings
received no federal copyright protection, but likely it was a significant reason for continued
lack of protection. For example, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works stated:
Certain states made it illegal to duplicate [sound recordings], but fed-
eral copyright remained almost powerless in this area. While this rule
was often criticized, its effect was apparently not too deleterious to
producers of recorded sounds, so long as the cost of ... duplication
made commercial piracy an expensive undertaking.
NAT'L COMM. ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
10(1979).
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large, prohibitively expensive industrial-grade machines.8 It was in-
feasible to make unauthorized duplications in quantities large enough
to harm the commercial market.9 The absence of a positive legal right
over sound recordings was thus partly explainable because technolog-
ical limitations were, in effect, reliably performing the constraining
function normally performed by copyright law. 10 Because the underly-
ing economic problem was cabined effectively by technological infea-
sibility, an explicit legal right to prevent copies would have been
superfluous.11
Note a parallel between the way in which positive copyright law
explicitly constrained certain activities (e.g., copying books) and
technological limitations implicitly constrained others (e.g., copying
sound recordings). In general, there is no good terminology to express
this latter quality of implicit technological constraint. This Article
proposes the term "Technological Cost" to capture how activities can
be implicitly constrained by limitations inherent to technological pro-
cesses of the past. In this usage, the copying of sound recordings had a
high Technological Cost because the implicit technological limitations
of the time period made copying difficult as a practical matter. 12
Technological Cost is important to consider because it can influ-
ence the shape and impact of positive IP law. IP laws are often struc-
tured upon unarticulated presumptions that activities will be implicitly
restricted by technological limitations. The copyright legal frame-
work, for example, by omitting protection for sound recordings, ap-
peared to depend upon sound recording copying remaining implicitly
constrained and Technologically Costly.13 However the Technological
Cost of activities can change over time. Emerging technologies fre-
quently eliminate the capacity-limiting constraints common in the
previous technological era. When legal frameworks depend upon ac-
tivities being Technologically Costly, they are susceptible to shifts in
8. ROBIN SANTOS DOAK, THE PHONOGRAPH 13-16 (2006); DAVID L. MORTON JR.,
SOUND RECORDING 92-93 (2004); see also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years ofSolici-
tude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900 2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2195 (2000).
9. A small number of unauthorized duplications of sound recordings occurred during this
era by highly motivated parties. For example, jazz enthusiasts duplicated jazz recordings
that had been orphaned or abandoned. However, by and large these uses were small and did
not undermine the commercial market for sound recordings. See Note, Piracy on Records, 5
STAN. L. REv. 433, 433-35 (1953).
10. Cf id. (explaining how recording companies' copyright rights were threatened only
after technological advancements make disk replication less costly).
11. Id. at 434 ("Although there were occasional instances of pirating in the years imme-
diately after the introduction of. . . the phonograph, the activity that bothered the recording
companies did not begin until much later.").
12. BARRY KERNFELD, POP SONG PIRACY: DISOBEDIENT Music DISTRIBUTION SINCE
1929 128 (2011) (describing how record copying equipment was tightly controlled and
difficult to access in the early twentieth century).
13. Id. (describing how sound recording commercialization in the early twentieth century
relied upon the difficulty of accessing record copying facilities).
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strength, scope, or effectiveness when the Technological Cost of ac-
tivities decreases.
Consider how a decrease in Technological Cost impacted the
copyright legal framework. In the 1960s, tape recording technology
emerged and for the first time enabled high-quality, inexpensive du-
plications of sound recordings.14 Third parties no longer needed to
access physically remote master records or industrial-grade equipment
to make usable copies.15 In a short amount of time the unauthorized
copying of creative works - copyright's core economic concern -
increased significantly. Third parties suddenly had the capacity to
threaten the commercial market for original recordings in ways that
were previously technologically infeasible. With background tech-
nological limitations no longer a reliable barrier, lawmakers respond-
ed by altering positive law.17 A patchwork of state common-law
protections began to emerge, and Congress finally added explicit fed-
eral protection for sound recordings in 1972.18
The sound recording example is illustrative of a more general pat-
tern throughout IP law. Technological limitations of the past often
have a practical constraining effect on activities that are important to
IP governance, such as copying in copyright law or manufacturing
goods in patent law. Positive IP laws may be structured upon the
premise that such activities will be implicitly constrained and Techno-
logically Costly. However, as new technologies emerge, such implicit
constraints often dissipate, and activities can become dramatically
more expansive in capacity and can acquire entirely new and expan-
sive properties that were previously infeasible. 19 As this occurs, IP
laws that are linked to these activities can subtly but meaningfully
shift in scope. Such technologically induced shifts in legal scope may
be hard to observe because positive law often remains unchanged. 20
This Article offers a framework for reitying relationships of im-
plicit constraint by technological limitations of the past. Diminishing
background constraint is an under-acknowledged factor driving
14. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2196.
15. See KERNFELD, supra note 12, at 141 ("Tape production was much simpler ... than
phonograph-record production.").
16. See NAT'L COMM. ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra
note 7, at 10 ("The development of inexpensive transistorized tape recording equipment and
its use by organized pirates posed serious economic problems for either the 1908 rule or the
recording industry."); see also Merges, supra note 8, at 2195-97.
17. See NAT'L COMM. ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra
note 7, at 10; see, e.g., KERNFELD, supra note 12, at 141 (concerning developments in tape
duplication technology in the late 1960s).
18. JASZI, supra note 5, at 7.
19. This phenomenon is not exclusive to IP law and is prevalent in law. See generally
Julia A. Singer, et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal Justice
System: Improvements and Complications, 17 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 87 (2007).
20. See infra Part 11.B (discussing changes in the impact of patent law's novelty doctrine
due to changes in Technological Cost).
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changes in IP law. Part II provides examples from the major IP legal
regimes (patent, copyright, trade secret, and trademark law) in which
the structure of positive law has depended upon high Technological
Cost, and a change in Technological Cost has led to subtle, but mean-
ingful, shifts in law. Scholars have previously observed this phenom-
enon in particular contexts, such as in the transition from analog to
digital music in copyright law.21 However, this dynamic has generally
not been systematically studied nor understood as part of a shared
phenomenon across IP legal domains.
Highlighting this dynamic of diminishing implicit constraint clari-
fies certain issues within IP policy. IP laws are thought to reflect care-
fully crafted regulatory balances. Changes in legal scope are usually
accompanied by changes in law, but when Technological Cost de-
creases, there can be, in effect, shifts in legal scope even as positive
law remains constant. In practice, IP laws may regulate differently
over time, becoming effectively stronger (or weaker), or covering dif-
ferent activities as compared to a previous era. In some cases core
assumptions of implicit constraint that undergirded IP laws in a prior
era may no longer apply after technological change.23 However, when
there has been no alteration in positive law, it is often rhetorically dif-
ficult to articulate that a substantive shift in IP law has occurred. In
actuality, sound policy may require rebalancing positive IP frame-
works following an externally induced shift. Changing Technological
Cost is an important dimension that needs to be accounted for within
IP legal analysis but is today difficult to express directly. Part II thus
provides a vocabulary for articulating how technological limitations
can implicitly constrain activities important to IP law and how the
dissipation of such constraint can shift the scope of IP laws.24
21. See, e.g., 1. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World,
1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1373-75
(2004) (observing how digital media is changing copyright owners' responses to infringe-
ment); Linford, supra note 4, at 587 (observing how technology implicitly limited what
could be done with physical books in the context of copyright's first publication right);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 91, 101
(2010).
22. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("As we have often ex-
plained ... the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
exclusive monopoly . . . .").
23. Anuj Desai, Big Entertainment Needs a Sequel to the Highly Anticipated Flop: MGM
v. Grokster, 41 GA. L. REv. 579, 596 (2007) ("Today, MP3 and P2P systems are prime
examples of technologies that stress the meaning of copyright law and the doctrine of sec-
ondary liability."); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc.,
351 F.3d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The Congress had no reason to foresee the applica-
tion of § 512(h) to P2P file sharing, nor did they draft the DMCA broadly enough to reach
the new technology when it came along.").
24. Scholars have observed this issue in particular discrete contexts. See, e.g., Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over Newi Technologies ofDissemination, 101 COLUM. L.
[Vol. 27140
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Part III argues that there may be implicit IP values embedded in
the technological limitations of the past.25 A value is explicitly pro-
tected when there is a positive law that constrains others from interfer-
ing with a valued activity. However, a value can be implicitly
protected when it is technologically infeasible for others to interfere
with a valued activity. For example, when books were only distributed
in paper (rather than electronic) form, it was technologically infeasi-
ble for copyright holders to prevent purchasers from lending their
books to others. Thus, there was an activity valued by certain societal
groups (e.g., lenders) that was protected, not by an affirmative legal
right to lend, but implicitly by the technological infeasibility of con-
straining that activity. From this arrangement, one might arguably
infer an implicit value embedded in the technological limitations of
paper book technology. The inability of copyright holders to constrain
post-sale lending may not simply have been an artifact of a past tech-
nology, but may arguably have reflected an embedded (but uncodi-
fled) social value - that the 2Post-sale control of copyrighted works
by authors should be limited. High Technological Cost may implic-
itly protect IP values in ways that may not be readily apparent.
Problematically, when values are only implicitly protected by
high Technological Cost rather than explicitly enshrined in positive
law, they can subtly erode with technological change.27 New technol-
ogies may allow interference with valued activities in ways that were
previously infeasible. For example, publishers can now constrain what
purchasers do with electronic books post sale in ways that were not
possible in the paper book era.28 To the extent that the ability to lend
books reflected an IP value implicitly protected by past technological
REv. 1613, 1614 (2001) (focusing upon shifts in the scope of copyright law driven by the
development of new technologies).
25. To the extent that scholars have emphasized the regulatory role of technology, they
have tended to focus on the micro level, and how design choices of technological systems
(e.g., websites, software, the Internet) can foster or inhibit societal values (e.g., privacy,
anonymity, transformative uses). See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 6 (2000) (arguing how software code and software design can effectively
promote or inhibit values in electronically mediated environments such as the Internet);
Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 575-76 (2003); John S.
Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers of Code-Based Fair
Use Enforcement, 92 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 985, 985 (2004); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 553, 554-55 (1998). But see Merges, supra note 8, at 2193-99 (focusing on a macro-
level view of technology).
26. For an analogous line of arguments in Constitutional law that there may be implicit
(non-written) rights or values embedded in practice or structure, see generally Andrew B.
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1025 (2010), and Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unvritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 703 (1975).
27. See infra Part III.
28. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF LIBRARY ASSOCIATIONS, IFLA E-LENDING
BACKGROUND PAPER 9 (2012).
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infeasibility, such values may "Technologically Erode" when emerg-
ing technologies allow such activities to be restricted. At this point
such implicit values are left unprotected either by high Technological
Cost or positive law. High Technological Cost may have been func-
tionally substituting for positive law. This raises a public policy ques-
tion: should policymakers use positive law (or some other means) to
explicitly protect values that were embedded in the technological lim-
its of the earlier period?29 Part III illustrates how a Technological Ero-
sion model can clarify certain intuitions in IP, including observed
disruptions in copyright fair use, and in patent and copyright exhaus-
tion.
Part IV theoretically grounds the Technological Cost framework
in the work of earlier scholars.30 IP legal frameworks depend upon
certain activities being Technologically Costly to maintain central
regulatory balances, for example balancing incentives to produce IP
goods against sufficient public access to these goods.31 This Part iden-
tifies general principles that have tended to characterize technologi-
cally induced shifts in legal scope. Changing technological feasibility
shifting the scope of law is not a phenomenon exclusive to IP law.
However, as IP law's topic of regulation is information itself,33 it is
particularly susceptible to such shifts as emerging technologies have
29. This question is complex because technological change can unlock novel, welfare-
enhancing activities, which lawmakers should be wary of inhibiting when replicating the
value protections of an earlier legal framework. See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky,
Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW J. TECH &
INTELL. PROP. 239, 258-61 (2013). The benefits found in big data analysis exemplify how
duplicating privacy protections from an earlier framework may inhibit novel, socially desir-
able activities.
30. The term "general regulation scholars" is the term I use to reference scholars such as
Lawrence Lessig and others, discussed supra at page 5 and note 25, who advanced the con-
cept of legal policymakers considering the major factors that influence behavior beyond
law. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 661 (1998);
see also Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
Nw. U.L. REv. 655, 657 (2006); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making
in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 912 (1996); Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy,
60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1606 (2007).
31. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy-
right Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) ("Striking the correct balance between access
and incentives is the central problem in copyright law."). Similar balance issues appear in
patent law. It is important to balance patent rights in foundational inventions against later
improvements. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement in Intellectual Proper-
ty Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 990-91 (1997).
32. For example, information privacy law is subject to a similar phenomenon. See, e.g.,
Chris Evans, It's the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the
Information Age, 13 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 867, 879-80 (2012); Surden, supra note 30, at
1617. For discussion of a property law changing in scope due to the invention of the air-
plane, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 1-3 (2004).
33. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1001 (2005). ("Intellectual property law creates exclu-
sive rights and thereby facilitates private restrictions on access to new information
goods. . . .").
[Vol. 27142
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decreased the Technological Cost of disseminating, aggregating, du-
plicating, and analyzing information. 34
Part V applies this Article's framework to contemporary IP prob-
lems. Three-dimensional printing is thought to be disruptive to copy-
right and patent law. The framework provides a theoretical
explanation as to why, and in what respects, it will be disruptive. In
short, copyright and patent laws are currently premised upon unarticu-
lated assumptions about the Technological Costliness of reproducing
three-dimensional objects.36 Three-dimensional printing will drastical-
ly lower the Technological Cost of duplicating and disseminating
physical objects, thereby undermining these premises that existing
legal frameworks implicitly depend on.37 This observation can be
used to predict upcoming issues, such as a likely increase in the im-
portance of secondary liability in infringement actions.38
The Technological Cost framework also reveals a new class of
"policy levers" to calibrate IP law.39 Lawmakers might reduce Tech-
nological Cost in targeted areas to achieve policy goals rather than
changing law. For example, invalid but issued patents are a problem
in patent law. In some cases, prior art documents exist that would
demonstrate invalidity, but the Technological Cost of actually locating
these documents is high given the large universe of documents to
search through and limited patent examination time.40 Recognizing
that laws implicitly depend upon Technological Cost, the most effec-
tive approach to achieve IP policy ends may not be changes in law,
but rather computational techni ues that reduce the Technological
Cost of finding relevant prior art.
34. See infra Part IV.C. Moreover, as discussed, IP goods tend to be more closely aligned
with technology than other substantive areas. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2202 (noting how
the DMCA amendment to the Copyright Act directly regulated specific technologies).
35. Peter Hanna, The Next Napster? Copyright Questions as 3D Printing Comes of Age,
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 6, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/04/
the-next-napster-copyright-questions-as-3d-printing-comes-of-age.ars.
36. See infra Part V.A.2.
37. CHRIS ANDERSON, MAKERS: THE NEw INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 88-89 (2012).
38. See infra Part V.B.
39. For a pioneering discussion of mechanisms to calibrate patent policy, see Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1579 (2003).
40. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 314 (2001) (noting that the average
time allocated to examining patents was about sixteen to seventeen hours, a short time given
the large universe of prior art).
41. Advances in machine learning algorithms have enabled the scanning of corpuses of
text documents to identify relevant exemplars. STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 865-77 (3d ed. 2010).
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II. TECHNOLOGICAL COST AND SHIFTS IN IP LAW
A. The Technological Cost Framework
1. IP Legal Scope and Positive Law
There are four major IP legal regimes - patent, copyright,
trademark, and trade secret law. In general, what these regimes have
in common is that they grant private parties some exclusive legal con-
trol over information.42 IP rights have a particular scope, meaning that
IP law does not give private parties the right to control every possible
piece of information, nor does it permit private parties to constrain
every use of information by others. Rather, IP law allows control over
only information that meets certain criteria, and the right to constrain
legally specific third-party activities concerning that information. Let
us describe the scope of an IP legal right as the strength and expanse
of control over information allowed under the law.
We normally think of the scope of IP legal rights as arising from
positive law.43 To determine the scope of IP rights one obvious source
is the body of positive IP law (i.e., statutes and case law) that express-
ly grant legal rights to control information. The copyright statute, for
example, identifies specific types of information (e.g., creative works)
that are the subject of the statute's exclusive control provisions and
grants specific exclusive rights concerning these works (e.g., the right
to prevent others from making copies).44 Similarly, the patent act
identifies certain types of inventive knowledge that are subject to ex-
clusive control (e.g., those that meet the requirements of patentabil-
ity), and grants specific exclusive rights concerning that information
(e.g., the right to prevent others from selling products embodying
claimed inventive technology). 45 Hence, one dimension to consider
when discerning the scope of IP legal rights is the private control over
information expressly created by positive statute and doctrine. We
might term those IP statutes and doctrines that expressly allocate ex-
clusive legal control over information "Control Structures."
42. The underlying social value of a patent, for instance, is generally not understood to be
in any particular product manufactured (e.g., a pharmaceutical drug that cures a disease), but
rather in the information describing how to make and use an invention that emerges once
developed. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property
and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 998 (2003). Similarly, the value
of copyrighted creative works is in the particular configurations of words, concepts, artistic
arrangements, or musical compositions that can be expressed as information. See Frisch-
mann, supra note 33, at 1001-02.
43. See, e.g., Linford, supra note 4, at 586-87 (discussing alterations to positive law to
add a limited copyright right of first publication online).
44. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (specifying the exclusive rights in copyrighted
works).
45. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (specifying the patent rights).
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In assessing scope, it is also important to consider how IP rights
are directly or indirectly bounded. All IP legal rights are cabined in
various ways because it is generally understood that too much private
exclusive legal control over information can create more harm than
good.46 We might call the various statutory provisions, doctrines, or
procedures that constrain the scope of exclusive IP rights "Bounding
Structures." For example, patent law's subject matter requirement
and non-obviousness doctrine,48 copyright's merger doctrine,49 or
trademark's distinctiveness requirement bound the scope of exclu-
sive rights by restricting certain information from being subject to
exclusive legal control. Other Bounding Structures grant non-owners
(e.g., the public) an affirmative right to use, without express authori-
zation, information protected by IP rights. Copyright's fair use doc-
trine is one such example.5 1 The positive scope of an IP legal right is
thus comprised of both those positive legal structures that expressly
grant exclusive rights and those structures that bound those rights. 52
Under one common view, lawmakers assess the appropriate scope
of IP legal rights and then calibrate positive law to implement their
determination.53 In this characterization, positive law reflects a delib-
erate balance ensuring that IP rights are sufficiently robust to address
the underlying economic (or other) concerns that animate IP law but
with Bounding Structures designed to lessen the cost of exclusive
control in particular settings.54 Thus, IP rights are thought to be
framed by positive law at particular set points that reflect this balance
46. See, e.g., William W. Fisher, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1203, 1211-12 (1998) (discussing the proper scope of intellectual property rights);
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 517-18 (2010) (dis-
cussing social costs imposed by patents).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (restricting patents to inventions that constitute a "new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter").
48. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
49. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (sum-
marizing the doctrine that if a copyrighted work expresses an idea, and there are only a
limited number of ways to express that idea, then the work merges with the idea and is not
copyrightable).
50. See, e.g., Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir.
1983) (describing how trademark law's distinctiveness requirements normally prevent
trademark control over marks classified as generic).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
52. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 1614 ("[T]he copyright statute and the judges
who interpret it attempt a balance: Creators should maintain sufficient control over new
markets to keep the copyright incentive meaningful, but not so much as to stifle the spread
of the new technologies of dissemination.").
53. See J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2432, 2451 (1994) (describing how the choice as to what to cover and not
cover in patent law and copyright law is deliberate).
54. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 132 (6th ed. 2012) ("[D]esigning the proper economic incentive
requires the policymaker to balance the length of the patent term, the appropriate standard of
invention, and the nature of the rights granted to patentees.").
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determination. When there is a change in the scope of an IP right (i.e.,
a law covers new or different activities, or becomes stronger) - we
normally presume that this has been the result of an explicit change to
positive law (e.g., a statute has been amended or there has been new
case law).55
2. IP Legal Scope and Implicit Technological Constraint
This Section suggests that IP rights can be scoped and bounded,
not just by positive law, but also by technological infeasibility. IP
laws are often linked to activities that are implicitly constrained by
technological limitations. As this implicit constraint dissipates due to
technological change, the scopes of these IP laws can subtly shift.
This dynamic will be captured through the concept of changing Tech-
nological Cost.
Consider an illustrative example of changing Technological Cost
impacting IP law. During the course of research, scholars often find it
useful to copy library materials for use at a later time. In the early
1900s, it was commonly understood that copyright's fair use doc-
trine permitted researchers to duplicate library books and articles as
needed, without permission, for their personal research records.57 Let
us call this the "Research Doctrine."
The Research Doctrine emerged in an era when the technology
for copying texts had significant limitations. In the early 1900s, the
primary means of duplicating the texts of library books and articles
was hand transcription.58 There are constraints inherent to the manual
55. For example, the Supreme Court has noted that:
[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope
of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inven-
tors . . . . Because this task involves a difficult balance between the
interests of authors and inventors . . . and society's competing interest
in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeated-
ly.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
56. In brief, copyright's fair use doctrine permits third parties to reproduce copyrighted
works without permission under certain circumstances without infringing. See MERGES ET
AL., supra note 54, at 435.
57. The Court of Claims noted:
[I]t is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a hand-
written copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use, and in
the era before photoduplication it was not uncommon (and not seri-
ously questioned) that he could have his secretary make a typed copy
for his personal use and files.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U. S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973). See Jennifer E.
Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899,
1916-18 (2007) (describing the so-called "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1935 which com-
mitted to writing an agreement reflecting the long standing practice of allowing researchers
to make copies of library materials even without permission of the copyright holder).
58. Williams, 487 F.2d at 1346.
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copying of texts - it is labor intensive and slow - and the Research
Doctrine, as it was generally expressed at the time, subtly reflected
these limitations. The doctrine tended not to include or even address
limits on the number of works that could be copied by any given re-
searcher. 59 Including such scope limitations in the text of this doctrine
may have appeared unnecessary at that time because constraints in-
herent to manual copying already provided a natural bound on the
scope of copying that any one researcher could realistically accom-
plish.
Around 1910 early machine-aided copying technology emerged.60
Although early copying machines, such as the "Photostat machine,"
had some modest advantages over hand copying in certain circum-
stances, in general this early technology had its own limitations that
constrained the scope of copying. Photostat machines were expensive
and centralized in specialty reproduction departments, and the copy-
ing itself was slow and produced poor quality reproductions.61 A
change in technology had occurred, but the Research Doctrine largely
operated as it had in the previous technological era. As a practical
matter, limitations inherent to early machine-aided technologies con-
tinued to bound the amount of third-party copying permitted under the
doctrine.
Several decades later a new technology for reproducing texts
photocopying - emerged. 62 Although initial photocopy machines had
some limitations, advances in the technology allowed researchers to
duplicate materials at a speed, cost, and quality previously infeasi-
ble. This significant increase in technological feasibility exposed
tensions between the Research Doctrine and copyright law that had
not been previously problematic. For example, in the 1973 Williams
case, government researchers were sued for copying articles for their
research collections.64 The researchers were operating as they had
historically, but due to technological changes were able to photocopy
articles at a pace and scope that had previously been infeasible. The
Williams court struggled to reconcile the long standing Research Doc-
trine within a new environment in which many of the technological
59. See Randall Coyne, Rights ofReproduction and the Provision ofLibrary Services, 13
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 485, 489 (1991) (describing the so-called Gentleman's Agree-
ment which formalized the understanding that "the practice of [a library] providing a single
copy of a copyrighted work to a user for the purpose of research, study, or other educational
use was well within the fair use doctrine").
60. DAVID OWEN, COPIES IN SECONDS: HOW A LONE INVENTOR AND AN UNKNOWN
COMPANY CREATED THE BIGGEST COMMUNICATION BREAKTHROUGH SINCE
GUTENBERG - CHESTER CARLSON AND THE BIRTH OF XEROX MACHINE 79 (2004).
61. See id. at 61.
62. See id. at 10.
63. See id. at 283.
64. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1347 49 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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constraints of the past had been shed. The Research Doctrine had
arguably increased in its scope over time, and that increase occurred
due to a change in technology and not an alteration of positive law.
By the 1990s, these conflicts were starkly illustrated as photocop-
ying technology improved to the point where it had lost even its initial
technical limitations. No longer relegated to specialty departments,
photocopying machines became decentralized, inexpensive, common,
and accessible to individual researchers. This enabled individual
researchers to copy materials on a much larger scale than previously
possible in an era of hand transcription, Photostat, and even early pho-
tocopying technology.
It became clear that the Research Doctrine, were it to have per-
sisted unaltered, would have allowed significantly more permission-
free copying than it had in the past when technological limitations
implicitly constrained the scope of copying. This tension was revealed
in the American Geophysical case, in which a for-profit firm used
modern photocopying machines to duplicate copyrighted materials en-
masse for its multiple research scientists, in lieu of paid purchases or
subscriptions for these materials. The company defended its copying
as a continuation of the historical practice permitting researchers to
copy materials for their personal archives under fair use. In finding
the copying not fair use, the court noted the importance of limiting
fair use copying when it impacted commercial sales - a topic not
previously problematic in the prior technological era.69 In short, al-
though the court did not have the vocabulary to articulate it, it strug-
gled with the implications of a law having a differential impact over
time due to intervening changes in technological feasibility.
3. Technological Cost as a Measure of Implicit Constraint
The prior example illustrated how implicit technological con-
straint can shape the scope of IP rights and boundaries. There was an
IP law (the Research Doctrine), and an activity central to its scope
(copying texts). Notably, in the early half of the twentieth century,
technological limitations implicitly constrained this activity, limiting
the amount of copying that could feasibly be done. This implicit tech-
nological constraint, in effect, limited the scope of the Research Doc-
65. Williams, 487 F.2d at 1380 ("The legitimate interests of copyright owners must, ac-
cordingly, be measured against the changed realities of technology.").
66. See OWEN, supra note 60, at 4 (describing the introduction of "copiers intended for
personal use").
67. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994). In response,
courts began changing the fair use rules of this era to impose restrictions on the scope of
copying. See also id. at 928-29 (discussing subscription purchases Texaco would have
made in the absence of photocopying).
68. See id. at 914-15.
69. See id. at 928.
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trine. However, as this activity became less technologically con-
strained, the boundary of the Research Doctrine shifted. This IP law
began to operate differently over time as technological change ena-
bled copying on a previously infeasible scale, undermining presump-
tions upon which the law had likely originally been based.
The specific dimension of change just described - changing lev-
els of implicit technological constraint - is an important driver of
change in IP law and should be accounted for directly in legal and
policy analysis. Today, however, this property is difficult to express
directly for lack of terminology. This Section thus provides an analyt-
ical framework, based upon the introduced concept of Technological
Cost, to more explicitly capture changes in technological feasibility as
a component of legal scope.
We can define Technological Cost more formally as a measure of
the way activities are often inherently restricted, constrained, limited,
or otherwise infeasible due to limitations characteristic of technolo-
gies of the past. For example, under this definition, the copying of
texts had a high Technological Cost in the early 1900s because manu-
al copying had inherent limitations such as labor intensiveness that
provided a natural bound to the scope of copying that could practical-
ly be done. Hence, Technological Cost is a property of activities rele-
vant to IP governance - such as copying texts, manufacturing
products, or disseminating information - in a particular time period.
Moreover, the term "cost" is used metaphorically, to express implicit
constraint due to technological infeasibility, and is not meant literally
as monetary cost. The more that an activity is implicitly constrained
due to the technological limitations of a given time period, the higher
the Technological Cost of that activity will be.
The most important point about Technological Cost is that implic-
it technological constraint can decrease over time with innovation. In
this Article's usage, an activity decreases in Technological Cost when
a new technology reduces or entirely eliminates limitations that in-
hered in earlier methods for conducting this activity. For example, the
Technological Cost of copying text decreased significantly with the
advent of photocopying because that technology did not suffer from
the significant speed and quality limitations of earlier technologies. In
general, following technological change, the same activity can often
be conducted much more expansively, or can acquire new properties,
and previously infeasible behaviors can become feasible. Changing
Technological Cost thus captures a particular dimension of change -
that of dynamically shifting technological feasibility over time - that
is not easy to articulate given current terminology.
This dimension of change is important to consider because there
is often a subtle relationship between positive IP law and Technologi-
cal Cost. The positive expression of an IP legal rule - what rights
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and limits are included or omitted in a law - can reflect unarticulated
presumptions about the Technological Cost of activities in the era in
which the rules are promulgated. For instance, the early formulations
of the Research Doctrine generally did not encompass limits on the
number of individual library books that a researcher could copy.70 The
absence of such scope restrictions likely reflected the fact that the
Technological Cost of copying was high during that period, and the
scope of copying was already constrained by limitations inherent to
manual and early machine-aided copying. More generally, we can
think about the structure of individual IP laws - what rights and lim-
its are included or omitted in the legal rules as expressed - as often
premised upon unstated understandings about the technological feasi-
bility of relevant activities.
Observing this relationship between positive IP law and high
Technological Cost is important because it highlights a specific way
in which IP laws (or IP legal frameworks) can begin to operate differ-
ently over time due to technological changes external to law. In the
prior scenario, the Research Doctrine, on its face, began to permit
significantly more fair use copying with the emergence of photocopy-
ing technology than the doctrine had permitted in the prior technolog-
ical era. Part of the reason for this change was that this legal doctrine
was based upon presumptions about the high Technological Cost of
copying that were true in the early 1900s, but were no longer true six-
ty years later following technological change. Thus, unstated pre-
sumptions of technological feasibility that initially shape the scope or
coverage of a given IP law can create a latent link between the impact
of the law and external changes in technological feasibility.
4. Changing Technological Cost as a Pattern of Disruption in IP Law
More generally, this example was meant to illustrate a broader
pattern in the way IP laws are frequently disrupted by technological
change throughout all of the IP legal regimes. In this pattern, there
was some activity, such as copying texts, that was relevant to the
scope, coverage, or effectiveness of a particular IP legal rule (such as
the Research Doctrine). That activity was implicitly constrained due
to limitations inherent to technological processes of the past. Reflect-
ing understandings about the technological state of the era, positive IP
laws promulgated during that era were structured upon unstated pre-
70. See Coyne, supra note 59, at 489 (noting the content of the so-called "Gentleman's
Agreement," which was generally believed to reflect contemporary beliefs about fair use
like permission for copying for research. Although the Gentleman's Agreement provided a
limit on the number of times that a researcher could copy any one book, it did not appear to
address limits on the number of different books that could be copied by a researcher).
71. See id. at 491 (noting that the Research Doctrine had been "crafted at a time when
photocopying was relatively expensive, cumbersome, and infrequent").
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sumptions that this activity would be implicitly constrained. These
unarticulated presumptions created a link between the scope of the IP
law and external technological change that was difficult to observe.
New technologies eventually emerged that reduced or eliminated
the technological constraint that had characterized the prior era. With
this reduction in Technological Cost, actors were able to conduct a
given activity at a speed, scope, or scale that was previously techno-
logically infeasible. There were several consequences of this reduc-
tion of implicit constraint. First, certain long-standing IP laws began
to operate differently (e.g., enlarged or strengthened in legal scope)
compared to their earlier baseline. The presumptions of implicit tech-
nological constraint upon which these laws were originally promul-
gated no longer held. Second, the new technology gave rise to
completely novel factual scenarios driven by fundamental changes in
technological feasibility. The existing IP legal framework was ill
equipped to handle these novel situations; the lawmakers of the prior
era, quite sensibly, had not bothered formulating legal rules to address
scenarios that had previously been technologically infeasible.
This pattern has been previously observed in particular contexts
in IP scholarly literature. For example, Trotter Hardy has studied the
way in which limitations in the state of the art of technology have of-
ten provided practical, non-legal constraints upon which the authors
of creative works have depended to capture economic value.72 Tom
Bell has analyzed the way in which decreases in the cost of requesting
and receiving permission to use copyrighted works put pressure on
fair use rules premised upon transaction costs.73 Multiple scholars,
including Gideon Parchomovsky and Philip J. Weiser, 74 Mark Lemley
and Anthony Reese, and Jane Ginsburg, observed that prevailing
equilibria in copyright law fundamentally shifted when creative works
migrated from analog to digital form in the 1990s, reducing techno-
logical limitations inherent to analog technology that had previously
provided natural bounds on duplication. Each of these scholars can
be understood as previously examining the phenomenon labeled here
as changing Technological Cost.
In general, however, the IP literature has not studied this dynamic
in a systematic or generalizable way. A methodical approach to ana-
lyzing this pattern can be helpful for several reasons. First, this dy-
namic is an important source of change in the impact and
effectiveness of IP law. IP legal architectures frequently depend upon
72. Hardy, supra note 21, at 6.
73. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Man-
agement on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 557 (1998).
74. Parchomovsky and Weiser, supra note 21, at 101.
75. Lemley and Reese, supra note 21, at 1373-76.
76. Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 1614.
77. Lemley and Reese, supra note 21, at 1375-76.
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activities being implicitly constrained by technological limitations,
and this relationship creates a latent link between the operation of IP
laws and external technological change. The elusive dimension of
changing technical feasibility described above is one that needs to be
directly accounted for within IP policy analysis. However, in general,
this aspect of change is difficult to express due to a lack of terminolo-
gy and concepts.
Second, relationships of implicit constraint can be subtle and dif-
ficult to observe unless one is affirmatively primed. The concept of
changing Technological Cost specifically is intended to capture the
phenomenon by which activities that were subtly cabined become less
constrained as the technological constraints of the past diminish. This,
in turn, allows us to observe more directly the way in which techno-
logical infeasibility may sometimes serve a functional role in the
overall architecture of IP legal regimes.
Finally, as will shortly be suggested, the lens of changing Tech-
nological Cost can help us better understand technological disruptions
in IP law, and see these changes as part of a larger pattern.
B. Structurally Constrained Activities
An activity has a high Technological Cost when it is implicitly
constrained by technological limitations. In some instances, it would
be informative to identify the particular technical limitations of the
past that had such a constraining effect. For instance, in the prior ex-
ample, the Research Doctrine coexisted in harmony with competing
copyright goals for many years before suddenly presenting problems
for IP policymakers in the 1970s. Why did a longstanding IP law ab-
ruptly operate differently compared to its historical baseline? The rea-
son proposed was that an activity - copying texts - had previously
been implicitly constrained by limitations inherent to past technolo-
gies, and that new technologies enabled copying at a finer granularity
and broader scope that was simply not possible in the prior technolog-
ical era.
To convey the source of such change we need terminology to di-
rectly reference those background barriers of the past that had the
practical effect of limiting the scope of particular activities. This part
proposes the term "Structural Constraint" to refer to any such back-
ground feature of the past that had the practical effect of making some
activity more difficult, more limited, slower, less granular, more labor
intensive, or generally less feasible. Relatedly, we can refer to any
activity that appears to have been fundamentally limited in this man-
ner as having been "Structurally Constrained."
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1. Structural Constraints in Patent Law
Consider another example of a law shifting in scope due to chang-
ing Technological Cost, this time from a different IP domain - patent
law. This example will also illustrate how identifying Structural Con-
straints can reveal how activities were implicitly technologically con-
strained in the past.
Patent law's novelty provision (section 102 of the patent statute)
mandates that patents only be issued on "new" inventions. That pro-
vision bars, in other words, patents for technologies that have been
previously created by an earlier inventor.79 One demonstrates that a
claimed invention is not novel by providing a "prior art" reference.
Prior art typically takes the form of a document - such as an earlier
patent or an article from a scientific journal - that signals earlier cre-
ation.so If such a document predates a claim and describes the claimed
invention in sufficient detail, the claim should be invalid for lack of
novelty. By finding prior art documents that signal earlier creation,
defendants in a lawsuit (or patent examiners) can show that technolo-
gy has been created by an earlier inventor and thus does not meet the
statutory novelty standard.
The strength of the novelty requirement partially depends upon
the ease of finding invalidating prior art documents. If such invalidat-
ing documents tend to be difficult to locate, the novelty provision will
be a weaker legal barrier. As a practical matter, defendants will be
unable to find existing, but inaccessible, documents that can demon-
strate invalidity. Conversely, if such documents tend to be easier to
find, it is likelier that defendants may be able to demonstrate invalidi-
ty, and the provision will tend to be a more substantial legal barrier.
For most of the history of patent law there were significant practi-
cal, physical, and technological barriers (i.e., Structural Constraints)
that limited the feasibility of finding prior art documents. In the early
twentieth century, for instance, the relevant documents were in paper
form. The physical nature of paper technology created obstacles to
locating certain types of documents as compared to the digital era.
Some potentially invalidating documents, such as student disserta-
tions, were practically inaccessible, housed in obscure library or gov-
78. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
79. The priority date by which one measures whether an invention was "earlier" has
shifted following the American Invents Act (AIA). Rules for determining priority date are
fairly complex under pre-AIA rules and are based upon invention date, but are substantially
simplified, and largely based upon filing date, for post-AIA patents (filed after Mar. 16,
2013). Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
81. Leahy-Smith America lnvents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. at 285-86.
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ernment archives, often embodied in only one physical copy.82 Others,
such as issued U.S. patents, were available only in voluminous paper
collections.
In addition, documents located abroad, such as foreign patents or
overseas scientific journals, represent large troves of potentially rele-
vant documents.83 However, for much of this period, such documents
were physically distant and often practically inaccessible. Moreover,
many were written in languages unfamiliar to U.S. searchers. This
linguistic hurdle acted as a distinct constraint limiting the scope of
English-language searches.
As a result, physical distance, the difficulty of finding obscure
documents resting in distant paper archives, and the laboriousness of
searching through large paper collections acted as barriers to locating
these invalidating prior art documents. 84
The technological feasibility of finding such remote prior art in-
creased significantly during the 1990s. First, many relevant docu-
ments began to be created in (or converted into) digital form during
this period. Second, many of these digital documents were placed on
the Internet and were accessible electronically from distant loca-
tions.85 These technological changes enhanced the capabilities of prior
art searchers in novel ways. Troves of remote or obscure docu-
ments - patents, patent applications, and scientific journals in foreign
countries - that are full of potentially invalidating prior art refer-
ences and that were practically inaccessible became available to dis-
tant researchers. With computerization, documents also became
easier to search and sort on a mass scale. Moreover, the internal con-
tents of these documents, such as the text of a thesis, rather than just
the name and subject of the document on a library index, became ac-
cessible to computer-based searches. Finally, automated translation
software made non-English documents comprehensible to English-
only speakers.87
82. See, e.g., Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters Inc., 453 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting); In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (describing a case
in which three student theses, housed in an obscure part of a library, were found).
83. An earlier foreign patent, for example, can serve as an invalidating prior art document
for a U.S. claim. See, e.g., SRAM Corp. v. AD-11 Eng'g, Inc., 367 F. App'x. 150, 154-55
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a Japanese patent application anticipated the U.S. patent).
84. In one well-known patent case, a defendant managed to find an obscure thesis in a
remote part of a university library that demonstrated the invalidity of the litigated patent.
See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
85. See, e.g., Invention Machine Corporation Launches Knowledge and Innovation Serv-
er at NMW '99, SINOCAST (Mar. 19, 1999) ("The [product] enables users to conduct Inter-
net searches of the U.S. and Japanese Patent Office databases.").
86. For example, patents from the Japanese Patent Office are searchable online. Search-
ing PAJ, NATIONAL CENTER FOR INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY INFORMATION AND TRAINING,
http://wwwl9.ipdl.inpit.gojp/PAl/cgi-bin/PAlINIT? (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
87. See, e.g., Google Translate, GOOGLE, http://translate.google.com/ (last visited Dec.
20, 2013).
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2. Structural Constraints and Shifts in Legal Scope
In analyzing the patent example, observe that the prior scenario il-
lustrated a change in Technological Cost that subtly shifted an IP law.
Patent law's novelty provision was structured around an activity with
a high Technological Cost - the finding of prior art documents. In
the era of paper documents, researchers could not easily find prior art
that was located in distant libraries, shelved in obscure or voluminous
paper archives, or written in unfamiliar languages. The impact of the
novelty provision was thus intermediated by the state of technological
advancement and the Structural Constraints of the era that implicitly
constrained this activity that was central to the scope of the law. With
the subsequent emergence of digitization, the Internet, networking,
and computer-aided sorting, analysis, and translation, the Technologi-
cal Cost of finding and using remote and voluminous prior art de-
creased. These emerging technologies diminished the effects of Struc-
Structural Constraints that had previously limited the central activity.
The decrease in Technological Cost, in turn, likely altered the im-
pact of the novelty provision (and other provisions, such as non-
obviousness, which also depend upon finding such documents). As a
practical matter, prior art searchers were able to access a broader trove
of previously inaccessible documents that could be used to demon-
strate invalidity, and sort through large volumes of prior art docu-
ments, in ways not previously technologically feasible.89 Following
this technological change, it was possible to engage in significantly
more of an activity -which the scope of the provision depended up-
on - as compared to the era in which the provision was originally
promulgated. To the extent that the novelty provision was structured
upon presumptions of implicit constraint, the impact of the provision
likely shifted as compared to its earlier baseline due to intervening
changes in technological feasibility.90 More theoretically, if we think
of the novelty provision as a Bounding Structure (since it limits the
type of inventions that can be the subject of exclusive patent rights),
then the scope of this Bounding Structure may have shifted from its
original legislative set point.
88. See, e.g., Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of
Disclosure, 44 CREIGHTON L. REv. 329, 361-62 (2011) (describing efforts to make foreign
prior art more accessible electronically); cf Bhaven N. Sampat, Determinants of Patent
Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/COLUMBIA/CO50902S.pdf
(suggesting that patent examiners prior to 2003 had "a comparative disadvantage in search-
ing for . .. foreign patents".)
89. Erstling, supra note 88, at 357 65.
90. See, e.g., JANICE M MUELLER, PATENT LAW 191 (4th ed. 2013) ("Why are there geo-
graphic distinctions? The statute probably reflects a historical notion, translated into an
evidentiary presumption, that 'personal' activities ... require greater effort to disseminate to
U.S. citizens than do domestic activities.").
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Note that Technological Cost was useful as a comparative metric
to express that a core activity relevant to the novelty provision's scope
meaningfully changed from one period to the next as the Structural
Constraints from the past diminished. Such a metric is crucial be-
cause, with technological change, previously infeasible behaviors can
become feasible and existing activities can often be conducted at a
speed or extent that represents a significant departure from what could
be done in the prior era. Following digitalization, prior art researchers
effectively gained a novel property that they did not previously
have - the ability to find and remotely search document archives. In
general, to the extent that a law such as the novelty provision may
have been premised upon the implicit constraint of the prior techno-
logical era, such a change directly needs to be accounted for in IP pol-
icy analysis.
The patent example provided a clear illustration of identifying
Structural Constraints - the specific constraining features of past
technological environments that normally may be overlooked as mere
background elements. In articulating such Structural Constraints, we
gain the ability to directly reference background mechanisms of the
past that implicitly limited activities important to the scope of IP laws.
In the prior example, the Structural Constraints that limited the find-
ing of prior art included the inability to access distant paper archives
(e.g., because of the need to access a physical paper document in or-
der to use it), and the difficulty of searching through voluminous pa-
per collections. More generally, a Structural Constraint can be any
feature of the past that had a practical limiting effect on an activity
relevant to a law. Identifying Structural Constraints allows us to ex-
plain directly why certain IP laws begin to operate differently from
their historical baseline following a technological change.
3. Technologically Induced Shifts in Legal Scope
Some additional terminology will be helpful. Substantive changes
in the scope of the law brought about by decreases in Technological
Cost can be captured by the concept of the "Effective Scope" of a law.
If we define the "Positive Scope" of a law as those activities a particu-
lar law does or does not cover based upon what is enumerated in the
text of statutes or doctrine, then the "Effective Scope" of the law takes
into account how the impact of positive law increases (or decreases)
as a practical matter as technology changes. In the above patent ex-
ample, we can say that the Effective Scope of the novelty doctrine
may have increased as patent examiners and litigation defendants
were able to find previously inaccessible invalidating documents. The
Effective Scope of the law describes the practical impact of a law as
mediated by the prevailing state of technology.
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Most laws are affixed in authoritative texts such as statutes, case
law, or constitutions, and such texts can persist in fixed form over
time. However, with technological change, novel activities can come
under the prima facie ambit of existing laws. If a particular law covers
new or different activities than it did previously as a result of a change
in Technological Cost, or allows significantly more of an existing ac-
tivity, then it has undergone a shift in Effective Scope. When a law
changes in effective strength or scope due to the changes in Techno-
logical Cost of an activity upon which the law depends, this is termed
a "Technologically Induced Shift in Scope."
Two issues arise from a Technologically Induced Shift in Scope
that are worth highlighting. First, such a shift may be overlooked be-
cause a change in the impact of a law is caused by a factor external to
the law - a technological change - while the positive text of the law
may remain unaltered. For example, section 102's novelty provision
likely shifted in scope, possibly even strengthening, as previously in-
accessible invalidating documents became accessible, but the text of
this provision remained the same during this period, making any shift
difficult to observe. 91 Second, even when noticed, such Technologi-
cally Induced Shifts in Scope are often difficult to articulate and char-
acterize in policy terms for lack of vocabulary.
In sum, the Technological Cost framework provides the terminol-
ogy to reify the implicit capacity-limiting effects of technological bar-
riers of the past in IP policy discussions. The concept of high
Technological Cost allows us to convey succinctly that a core IP ac-
tivity was implicitly constrained. Relatedly, by identifying Structural
Constraints we can specifically articulate the particular mechanisms
from the past that were doing the constraining. It is important to be
able to directly reference Structural Constraints because they may be
overlooked as mere background elements but can be highly relevant
to the scope and impact of IP laws. Their capacity-limiting role is of-
ten revealed only in retrospect after a new technology emerges and
permits us to conduct the activity in a different, unconstrained way.
By contrast, a change in a positive IP statute or doctrine that changes
IP governance is less likely to be missed because of the explicit and
identifiable legal form that positive law takes.
91. The technological shift described above makes it likely that the novelty provision in-
creased in Effective Strength, at least along the dimension of accessing remote prior art.
However, it is difficult to know whether it increased in strength overall- this is an empiri-
cal matter. There may have been countervailing technological changes that opposed this
decrease in Technological Cost. For example, in what one might call the "growing hay-
stack" effect - as in the metaphor for searching for a needle in a haystack - while the
Technological Cost of sorting through each document may have decreased, the overall size
of the haystack may have increased when a much larger universe of prior art documents for
which to search through became available electronically.
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Technological Cost can be useful because the shift in Effective
Scope just described is illustrative of a larger phenomenon throughout
IP law. In general, such shifts take the following form: (1) there is
some aspect of positive IP law - such as a statutory provision or
overall IP legal framework - that depends upon an activity (e.g.,
finding prior art); (2) that activity is implicitly limited by Structural
Constraints inherent to the prevailing technology of the past; (3) that
activity becomes technologically less costly with innovation and is no
longer restricted by the Structural Constraints, increasing its feasibil-
ity or endowing the activity with novel properties; and (4) the de-
crease in Technological Cost causes an Effective Shift in the impact
of the positive law or is disruptive of a prevailing legal equilibrium.
C. Changing Technological Cost and Novel Problems for IP Policy
Having fully developed the Technological Cost framework, let us
apply it to additional issues of IP public policy. The earlier sound re-
cording and photocopying examples illustrated a common scenario
within IP law. In each case, there was a long-standing IP law, and for
many years competing IP policies coexisted in harmony under the
prevailing arrangement. At some point, an activity that had not histor-
ically been problematic - such as third-party copying - abruptly
began to raise novel policy tensions following a technological change.
The lens of changing Technological Cost and Structural Constraints
allows us to understand better such scenarios by drawing our attention
to relationships of earlier, implicit technological constraints that are
otherwise difficult to see. Consider the following example.
1. Google Books and Legal Shifts via Changing Technological Cost
The Google Books project brought about shifts in copyright that
can be captured by changing Technological Cost.92 In this project,
Google partnered with several major university libraries to convert the
libraries' paper books into electronic form. 93 Google used high-speed
optical scanners to image each page of millions of books housed in
the libraries' permanent collections.94 The texts of these books were
then extracted using optical character recognition (OCR) software,
which converted images of printed text into digital form, and thereby
allowed each individual word of the text to be edited and processed by
computers. 95
92. See Google Books, GOOGLE, http://books.google.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
93. James Grimmelmann, Hou To Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 No. 10 J.
INTERNETL. 1, 11 (2009).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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This conversion allows the internal text of these paper books to be
fully searchable by computer - many for the very first time.96
Through a tool known as Google Book Search, Google can match
search queries to the full text of scanned paper books. 97 Importantly,
and by design, Google Book Search will not show the entirety of the
text of any scanned book that matches a query. Rather, Google typi-
cally displays on the screen a limited "snippet" or excerpt of the text
that shows a restricted part of the book and some surrounding lines or
paragraphs for context.
The fact that Google only displays limited excerpts is important
for complying with copyright's fair use doctrine. As discussed, the
fair use doctrine permits third parties to reproduce copyrighted works
under certain circumstances without permission and without infring-
ing.99 Historically, under what I'll call the "Excerpt Doctrine," fair use
permitted third parties to excerpt the text of copyrighted works with-
out authorization in a number of scenarios with high social value, as
long as the excerpt was reasonably limited in scope, in good faith, and
with minimal commercial impact. 100 For example, it was generally
understood that scholars could include limited verbatim quotes from
an original source in a scholarly work without infringing. 10 Similarly,
critics reviewing books could generally excerpt a direct quote from a
book under review without permission and without infringing. 102 The-
se are what I'll call "Embedded Excerpts" - in which a limited ver-
batim portion of the text of an original source appears somewhere
within the larger text of a third-party paper book or article. Google has
argued that its on-screen excerpts, displayed in response to Google
Book Search queries, are similarly covered under fair use.103
With the advent of Google Book Search it became intuitively
clear that some fundamental structural shift in copyright law and pre-
vailing fair use rules had occurred. Indeed, fearing the economic im-
pact of the project, several groups representing book authors sued
Google for copyright infringement, arguing that Google Book
96. Id.
97. About Google Books, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/googlebooks/about/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 20, 2013).
98. Grimmelmann, supra note 93, at 11.
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). To be clear, not all excerpts are considered fair use, but
those that are used in scholarly and limited contexts are likely to be fair use. See, e.g., Max-
tone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986); Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
100. See Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d
1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 1986); Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation
Policy for the Digital Age, 44 HOUS. L. REv. 1013, 1067-69 (2007).
101. See, e.g., Penelope v. Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132 (D. Mass. 1992) (finding verbatim
quotes in a writing manual from a scholarly work to be fair use).
102. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2537, 2551-53
(2009) (describing criticism and fair use).
103. See Grimmelmann, supra note 93, at 12.
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Search's use of excerpts does not constitute fair use.104 However, it
has been difficult, from a public policy perspective, to articulate the
precise nature of the change that occurred.
Why did a doctrine, which had permitted fair use excerpting
without controversy for many years, abruptly raise novel policy ten-
sions following the emergence of Google Books? Viewing this
through the lens of changing Technological Cost provides some clari-
fication. In the era of paper books, the Technological Cost of access-
ing Embedded Excerpts was high. Structural Constraints arising from
paper book technology had the practical effect of limiting the extent to
which Embedded Excerpts from the text of third-party books could be
used or accessed by others. Consider a long scholarly treatise that in-
cluded a five-line excerpt from another source embedded somewhere
in its paper text. As a practical matter, such a deeply Embedded Ex-
cerpt would not be accessible to a researcher who does not know
ahead of time that the volume contains that excerpt. Locating such an
Embedded Excerpt would require reading the text of the volume until
the passage was found - a laborious exercise. Such a Structural Con-
straint on the ability to find and access such Embedded Excerpts lim-
ited the degree to which any excerpt would commercially substitute
for the same passage in the original source.
Other Structural Constraints of the past meant that Embedded Ex-
cerpts from paper books were unlikely to harm in a meaningful way
the commercial demand for originals. Excerpts are by definition selec-
tions of text from a larger original source, and therefore generally
contain incomplete amounts of information. One excerpt alone may
be of limited research use compared to the broader range of infor-
mation often found in an original. A limited Embedded Excerpt from
a third-party paper treatise may not functionally substitute for access
to the original source for most research purposes. In the past, if a re-
searcher needed more context beyond that which was excerpted in a
third-party volume she would have had to access a copy of the origi-
nal source. In general, as these points illustrate, the Technological
Cost of accessing and using Embedded Excerpts from the text of pa-
per volumes was high, as the Structural Constraints of paper provided
natural limits on the usefulness and accessibility of any given excerpt.
This implicit limitation arising from the Structural Constraints of
paper technology was important for copyright policy. The Excerpt
Doctrine reflects a wider tension at the heart of copyright law. Copy-
right law permits authors to prevent others from copying their creative
works without permission. If copyright legal rights are not strong
enough and if unauthorized copies of creative works proliferate, it is
104. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
105. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992)
(describing the broad rights granted under copyright law).
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generally believed that the commercial value that the author herself
can capture from her work will be diminished. 10 This raises concerns
that socially valuable creative works will be underproduced society-
wide if authors believe, as a general matter, that they will not be able
to recoup their creative investments in the market after devoting re-
sources to their creation.107
However, if copyright legal rights allow too much control over in-
formation, other socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works - such
as creating scholarly texts or critical essays that use excerpts - will
be unduly inhibited.108 Excessive legal control over information might
diminish important societal values such as the right to speak freely or
create works that build upon earlier creations, if legal permission is
required in every instance.109 Mindful of these competing concerns,
policymakers are thought to craft deliberately the scope and strength
of copyright laws at a general set point: strong enough to address the
underlying economic issues that are particular to information-based IP
goods, but consciously bounded by fair use rules that allow permis-
sion-free uses of creative works in socially desirable circumstances. 110
The high Technological Cost of the previous era played an im-
plicit, but crucial, role in maintaining such a balance between control
over, and access to, copyrighted works. In that era, copyright's Ex-
cerpt Doctrine permitted third parties to embed limited excerpts in
works without permission. This unauthorized use provided the larger
social benefit - permitting scholars or critical essayists to provide
freely context within their writings, without acquiring a license for the
use - that animates the fair use doctrine. Permitting this class of un-
authorized uses was reasonable within the policy balance between
control and use because the commercial impact of Embedded Ex-
cerpts was limited by high Technological Cost. Structural Constraints
arising from paper technology prevented Embedded Excerpts from
functioning as commercials substitute for the original source in most
cases. This, in turn, limited the impact of Embedded Excerpts on the
106. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1399 (6th
Cir. 1996) (describing incentive structure and limits in copyright law).
107. See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 328.
108. Justice Blackmun wrote:
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this
monopoly would inhibit the very 'Progress of Science and useful
Arts' that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is
the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to
refer to and to quote the work of prior scholars.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun,
J. dissenting).
109. See Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Where strict
enforcement of the rights of a copyright holder . .. would conflict with the purpose of copy-
right law or with some other important societal value, courts should be free to fashion an
appropriate fair use exemption." (internal citation omitted)).
110. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32.
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value that could be appropriated to the original. As in the sound re-
cording example discussed earlier, a central equilibrium at the core of
copyright was implicitly maintained by high Technological Cost, an
activity relevant to IP governance. II As long as the high Technologi-
cal Cost prevailed, the central implicit policy balance was maintained.
Following the advent of the Google Book project and the release
of the Google Book Search tool, the prevailing balance was disturbed.
Google Book Search decreased the Technological Cost of displaying,
accessing, and manipulating excerpts as compared to the previous era
of paper books. Google Book Search is completely electronic, allow-
ing for full text searching of the contents of books.112 The excerpts
displayed in the Google Books context are therefore dynamic, chang-
ing in response to each specific query. Moreover, these queries can be
arbitrary, in the sense that the text of books can be searched against
any word or phrase, multiple times, producing a different set of ex-
cerpts each time. By contrast, Embedded Excerpts from paper books
are limited to a number of pre-selected portions that are affixed to a
printed page. Thus, dynamic, electronic, on-screen Google excerpts
are unlike the Embedded Excerpts of the past, which were structurally
limited in accessibility, quantity, and surrounding context.
Google Book Search technology disrupted other capacity-limiting
Structural Constraints from the past. Google Book Search can display
excerpts from any part of the text of the original source that has been
scanned and converted into electronic form. This permits random ac-
cess to excerpts. By contrast, as discussed, Embedded Excerpts from
paper books were often functionally obscured within the pages of a
larger third-party text. Additionally, since Google Books excerpts are
displayed electronicall1 on screen they can be shown to millions of
users simultaneously. Paper books are physical and are therefore
rival goods, meaning that if one is using a particular copy of a book it
necessarily precludes another person from simultaneously using it.
Each person who desires use of a rival good, such as a copy of a book,
either has to acquire his or her own copy or wait until the existing
copy is no longer being used. Relatedly, the physical form of paper
books meant that the use of distant books was not practical. In sum,
electronic Google Books excerpts have novel properties that Embed-
ded Excerpts from paper books do not possess.
The change in Technological Cost resulting from electronic dis-
play and access to excerpts meant that Google Book excerpts, while
superficially the same as excerpts in the paper world, in fact, bore
novel technological properties that impacted copyright policy. The
111. See supra Part 1.
112. See supra Part II.B.1.
113. See Emily Anne Proskine, Google 's Technicolor Dreancoat: A Copyright Analysis
ofthe Google Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 228 (2006).
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policy justifications that undergirded the Excerpt Doctrine in the pa-
per world may no longer apply in a world in which excerpts are no
longer implicitly bounded in scope by Structural Constraints.
Thus, an Excerpt Doctrine which persisted from one era to the
next and which permitted one to display limited portions of copy-
righted text without permission operated very differently in the later
period due to technological change. In this Article's terminology, the
legal doctrine underwent a Technologically Induced Shift in Effective
Scope with the change in Technological Cost. In the past, the implicit
scope-limiting effects of the Structural Constraints meant that Em-
bedded Excerpts met a reasonable policy balance between commercial
impact and excessive control. After the advent of Google Books, this
balance no longer prevailed, with Google Book Search excerpts capa-
ble of commercially substituting for original works in ways that Em-
bedded Excerpts from paper books were not able to previously.
2. IP Public Policy and Changing Technological Cost
Legal shifts such as the one induced by Google Book Search have
implications for IP policy. Although such disruptive shifts are com-
mon throughout IP law, there is neither a good vocabulary for discuss-
ing these shifts nor a framework for characterizing what occurred in
the context of policy decisions.
Consider the policy issues raised when the judge assigned to the
Google Book Search lawsuit analyzes whether Google Books excerpts
constitute copyright infringement under existing law.114 The judge is
in the position of confronting a novel legal issue and analyzing
whether copyright law and its fair use boundaries should change in
response to Google's emerging technology. A judge encountering
such an issue could, upon superficial analysis, conclude that little
meaningful has changed from an IP public policy standpoint in this
new technological context. The problem is that there is an inaccurate,
but seemingly plausible, line of reasoning that suggests that the
change brought about by the technology is one of degree rather than
kind, and that existing laws are more or less operating as they have
historically. 115
This line of reasoning might proceed as follows: (1) copyright's
fair use doctrine has historically allowed excerpts when the portion
114. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-94 (1994) (discussing
fair use factors and analysis).
115. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of ReDigi Inc's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 19-22, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y
2013) (No. 12 Civ. 95) (arguing that the first sale doctrine is consistent between older ana-
log and modern digital environments).
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reproduced is small, and the excerpts advance a very useful public
purpose, such as scholarship or criticism, and there is minimal com-
mercial impact; (2) similarly, Google Book Search limits the size of
excerpts, and Google Book Search provides a very valuable public
resource - the ability to search the full text of millions of previously
inaccessible books; and (3) following this logic to the extreme, one
might articulate that the fair use rule is simply continuing to allow an
activity it is has always allowed - the display of limited excerpts for
public purposes.
For an IP lawmaker without a framework for piercing this super-
ficial argument, such a line of reasoning may seem plausible. This
analysis is incomplete, however, because it ignores the Structural
Constraints of the past that had played an implicit, but significant,
scope-limiting role in maintaining a reasonable balance between con-
trol and use of IP in the context of paper excerpts. Google Book ex-
cerpts are, technologically, a very different type of excerpt than found
in the paper based past. Thus, the policy considerations that historical-
ly animated the Excerpt Doctrine in a context in which excerpts were
Structurally Constrained may no longer apply. Copyright legal rights,
or the positive scope of the fair use rule, might need explicit re-
balancing or re-architecting in light of a change in technology.
However, if one is not able to articulate cogently the nature of the
change and provide a metric of comparison as to how the Excerpt
Doctrine on its face operates quite differently in the context of Google
Book Search than it did in its past, such a policy argument is difficult
to make. After all, there has been no change in positive law during
this time - both copyright law and the fair use Excerpt Doctrine re-
mained unchanged - the fair use rule still permits, on its face, lim-
ited, socially useful excerpts. The change that occurred was
exogenous to law: the Technological Cost of accessing, using, and
displaying excerpts decreased, shifting the scope of the Excerpt Doc-
trine, even as positive law remained constant.
To be clear, my argument is not about whether or not Google
Book Search should ultimately be considered fair use. Rather, the
point is theoretical: scenarios such as Google Book Search should be
understood as necessitating a completely novel policy analysis, rather
than a continuation of the policy reasoning that animated past fair use
rules. In the case of a significant departure from the past, in which
activities are no longer Structurally Constrained, policymakers should
recognize that a novel analysis may be required. As part of this novel
analysis, policymakers should weigh the public benefits of the tech-
nology against the impact to copyright-holders' commercial market.
After conducting such an analysis, lawmakers might indeed conclude
116. See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publ'g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 158 (2d
Cir. 1990) (finding copying eight percent of a work as fair use).
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that Google Book Search is fair use given its benefits weighed against
its costs.
Stepping back for a moment, this argument extends beyond the
Google Book Search context. Anytime that there is a law that is prem-
ised upon unarticulated presumptions that some activity will be Tech-
nologically Costly (e.g., accessing embedded excerpts), and an
external technological change lowers such Technological Cost, that
law requires a deliberate re-examination by policymakers. To permit
such a law to persist in its existing form following a relevant techno-
logical change, without a deliberate public policy analysis as to
whether that law still meets IP policy goals, is a mistake. Such inac-
tion is actually tantamount to allowing external technological change
passively to shift the scope of positive law. As the legal realist schol-
ars noted, inaction by lawmakers can be as significant in shaping law
and policy as express lawmaker action."
The point is that a significant reduction in Technological Cost of-
ten generates a wholly novel IP context whose proper assessment may
necessitate a new allocation of rights. However, the necessity of such
a novel policy assessment may not be apparent when the shift in-
volves changes of technological degree and the context superficially
resembles existing, well-understood IP scenarios. In such a case, it is
important to be able to (1) articulate that a meaningful change has
occurred, (2) describe the nature of that change, and (3) assert that the
technological change may mandate a novel re-assessment of rights
and access from its historical baseline. This Article proposes focusing
upon the Structural Constraints of the prior technological era that had
an implicit, capacity-limiting effect.
There are thus three basic questions to ask following a technolog-
ical change such as Google Book Search: (1) what activities used to
be limited practically by background Structural Constraints prior to
the change?; (2) to what extent was positive IP law dependent upon
these implicit capacity-limiting effects?; and (3) in what ways have
the scope-limiting effects of the past been diminished by technologi-
cal change, and how has this impacted IP balances as compared to the
prior period? These three questions highlight the way in which posi-
tive IP legal frameworks may have been implicitly dependent upon
activities having a high Technological Cost.
117. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2013 WL
6017130 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013) (finding Google Books fair use).
118. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470, 470-94 (1923).
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D. Technological Shifts in Other IP Legal Domains
The phenomenon of Technologically Induced Shifts is prevalent
across all the IP domains (i.e., copyright, patent, trade secret, and
trademark). As Part IV will discuss, a major reason is that all IP legal
regimes regulate goods that are, at their core, information. Technolo-
gy has greatly increased the ability to aggregate, disseminate, trans-
mit, search, and analyze information. 119 Thus, information has been
the locus of many of the most substantial shifts in technology of the
last century. Thus, while not exclusive to IP, legal domains, like IP,
that are closely connected to information have seen dramatic Techno-
logically Induced Shifts.120 As examples given so far have primarily
originated from copyright and patent law, this Section provides exam-
ples of shifts in Technological Cost from the remaining IP domains.
1. Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law gives legal protection over the unauthorized tak-
ing of secret commercial information, such as manufacturing process-
es, chemical formulas, or industrial designs.121 However, under one
widely accepted rule, if formerly secret information becomes broadly
known to the public, then trade secret protection for that information
is no longer possible.122 Thus, the scope of a trade secret rule that
grants protection only to information that is not widely known is im-
plicitly dependent upon the Technological Cost of information diffus-
ing to the wider world. If the Technological Cost of information
joining the public sphere of knowledge decreases, some class of trade
secrets will become more vulnerable to the loss of protection as tech-
nology changes. 123
This precise scenario occurred in Religious Technology Center v.
Lerma in 1995.124 In that case, The Church of Scientology had secret
church documents that were posted on the Internet by a disgruntled
former member for at least ten days. The court found that the infor-
mation, once posted on the Internet, had entered the public sphere of
119. HUI-LIANG TSAI, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS PROCESS
REENGINEERING: NEW PERSPECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 120 (2003).
120. Other areas of law that regulate information, for example privacy law, have also
seen analogous issues of scope shift. See infra Part III.
121. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
122. Id. at 1002 ("Information that is public knowledge or that is generally known in an
industry cannot be a trade secret.").
123. For a discussion of trade secret law in the digital era, see Victoria A. Cundiff, Rea-
sonable Measures To Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment, 49 IDEA 359 (2009).
124. 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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knowledge, making the church documents "generallv known" and
therefore no longer eligible for trade secret protection.
The Religious Technology case, and the novel challenges for trade
secret policy that arose from it, can be clarified through the lens of
changing Technological Cost. Prior to the 1990s - in the era of paper
documents and absence of Internet access - diffusing secret infor-
mation widely enough into the public sphere so as to become general-
ly known was Technologically Costly. The physical nature of paper
effectively constrained the degree to which such secret information
could spontaneously and easily enter the public domain.
The Technological Cost of quickly and widely diffusing infor-
mation decreased significantly in the 1990s, thereby shifting the Ef-
fective Strength of the trade secret "widely known" bounding rule.
The widespread adoption of the Internet beginning in the early 1990s
allowed easy and widespread dissemination of information. While the
diffusion of information previously would have been implicitly re-
stricted by the Structural Constraints inherent to paper documents, the
Internet made it feasible to disseminate information instantly world-
wide with little effort.
Thus the scope of a trade secret rule that denied protection to in-
formation that became "generally known" was implicitly dependent
upon the Technological Cost of disseminating information. The rule
substantively shifted in Effective Strength when these costs decreased.
Note that some parallel technological changes may have effectively
strengthened trade secret law under some circumstances. For example,
the ability to encrypt information acted as a countervailing force in
potentially raisingythe Technological Cost of disseminating trade se-
cret information.
2. Trademark Law
A final example comes from trademark law. An infringement ac-
tion under federal trademark law only encompasses an unauthorized
use of a mark that is considered a "use in commerce." 127 This limita-
tion is intended to permit a set of unauthorized uses of a trademark for
non-sales purposes (e.g., discussions about products). 128 The scope of
125. Id. at 1368 ("As other courts who have dealt with similar issues have observed, post-
ing works to the Internet makes them 'generally known' at least to the relevant people inter-
ested in the news group." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. See Cundiff, supra note 123, at 367.
127. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d. Cir. 2009) ("[A] complaint
fails to state a claim under the Lanham Act unless it alleges that the defendant has made
'use in commerce' of the plaintiffs trademark as the term 'use in commerce' is defined in
15 U.S.C. § 1127.").
128. See generally Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1839, 1892 (2007).
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the standard "use in commerce" was implicitly dependent upon new
commercial uses of trademarks that technological change might bring,
and effectively enlarged when the Internet enabled novel uses that
were previously infeasible.
In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., the court found that when a
user searches Google for a company name (i.e., mark), and Google
shows an advertisement for a competitor near the search results, this
act of association between search result and company mark constitut-
ed a potentially infringing "use in commerce." 12 The court reasoned
that Google profited from displaying these advertisements, even if
Google was not directly selling the underlying product. 1o A rule gov-
erning "uses" in commerce was capable of expansion as technology
enabled novel modalities of using trademarks in a commercial busi-
ness model.
The novel problem of Rescuecom for trademark policy can be
usefully understood through the lens of changing Technological Cost.
In the pre-digital world, associating marks with goods or services was
Technologically Costly. In that era, endowing a product with a mark
often had a physical dimension. In many cases association was formed
by physically putting a mark on a product's packaging that indicated
the source of the product. In other cases, association occurred through
signs within stores that indicated the origin of the product or services
nearby. Even when there was no physical product involved with asso-
ciation - as in an advertisement in a magazine referencing a prod-
uct - such an advertisement in the past often required a physical
image of the advertisement on a page or on film in the case of moving
media. The physicality of access to a product and the limitations of
printed media constrained the amount of association between products
and services and the contexts in which such association could occur.
This limitation constrained the degree to which intermediaries -
firms that only made associations, but did not actually sell the under-
lying products - could profit from such association.
With the advent of electronically mediated purchasing over the
Internet, the Technological Cost of associating marks with products
and services fell, and the contexts in which such association could
occur enlarged. Unlike associating goods with marks in the past,
which often had a limiting physical dimension, in electronic con-
texts - such as Google associating search results with relevant asso-
ciations - it is now technologically less costly to associate with
marks. Moreover, the ability to associate a mark with a product in
129. Rescuecon, 562 F.3d at 127 28.
130. Id. at 126 ("Rescuecom alleges that Google makes ninety-seven percent of its reve-
nue from selling advertisements through its AdWords program. Google therefore has an
economic incentive to increase the number of advertisements and links that appear for every
term entered into its search engine.").
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electronic contexts means that "uses in commerce" have novel proper-
ties that such uses did not have in the era of physical goods. Asso-
ciations can be quickly and dynamically overlaid onto any part of the
online experience. Thus, intermediary firms, like Google, are able to
profit from possibly confusing electronic associations in search results
in ways that were not feasible in the pre-digital age. Therefore, the
policy assumptions that undergirded the positive trademark rules in
the prior technological era may no longer be relevant, as the implicit
limitations by the Structural Constraints of physical goods do not ap-
ply in this context.
In sum, this Part has described a general phenomenon throughout
IP law. In the past, there was some activity that was Technologically
Costly and Structurally Constrained. In that period, positive IP law
was structured to reflect an expectation that this Structural Constraint
would continue. In its previous constrained form, the activity did not
pose a significant problem for the concerns that animate IP policy. An
emerging technology reduced the capacity-limiting Structural Con-
straints of the past, rendering the activity significantly more capa-
cious, or endowing it with novel properties that affected core IP
concerns in ways that were not previously problematic. The Techno-
logical Cost framework provides a way of describing such Technolog-
ically Induced Shifts. It also provides a metric for characterizing the
nature of the shift by reifying the scope-limiting effects of Structural
Constraints of the past, the way in which positive IP law depended
upon these constraints, and deliberately articulating the ways in which
the novel technology permits the activity to be conducted in a new,
unconstrained form.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL EROSION OF IMPLICIT IP VALUES
A. Values Implicitly Protected by Technological Cost
The Technological Cost framework highlights how activities can
be implicitly constrained by technology in ways that matter to IP gov-
ernance. Through this lens one can also understand how IP values
may be embedded subtly in the technological limitations of the past.
While some valued activities may be explicitly protected by positive
law, others may only be implicitly protected by the technological in-
feasibility of interfering with them. From the latter arrangement, one
may arguably infer the existence of implicit IP values. If such values
exist (and they are contestable) they may be easy to overlook within
IP policy discussions because they are not explicit. Such implicit val-
131. See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d
1137, 1141-43 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the purchasing of online advertisements as a use
in commerce in trademark).
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ues may also be vulnerable to erosion when technology changes. This
Part presents a vocabulary for identifying implicit IP values that are
potentially embedded in the technological limitations of the past.
Consider an example of an implicit IP value that is arguably em-
bedded in past technological infeasibility. Purchasers of paper books
(as opposed to electronic books) have the ability to lend these books
to others in a relatively unconstrained fashion. 32 Even if copyright
holders wanted to restrict lending of paper books and require borrow-
ers to purchase their own copies, there is little that a copyright holder
can do to prevent this from a practical standpoint. It is technologically
infeasible for a copyright holder to detect when a paper book is lent,
and a copyright holder cannot technologically prevent a borrower
from reading a paper book.
The ability to lend purchased paper books, without interference
from copyright holders, is a valuable activity for certain groups in
society (e.g., borrowers). One might plausibly argue that the ability to
lend books is an IP social value that is implicitly embedded in the lim-
itations of paper technology. In other words, one might contend that
the ability to lend paper books is not simply a value-neutral artifact of
a limited earlier technology, but rather may represent a latent IP social
value (i.e., that purchased books should be freely lendable) that is fos-
tered by the limitations of paper technology.
If the ability to lend books unimpeded is indeed an embedded IP
value, it is important to note that it has historically been protected by
the technological infeasibility of actually constraining lending, and
not by an affirmative legal right to lend and borrow. We might term
such a value a "Structural Value" because it is not explicitly enshrined
in law, but rather is only implicitly embedded in the structural limita-
tions of past technologies. Its unconstrained existence has been due to
the technological infeasibility of others interfering with the valued
activity.
This part develops the concept of such Structural Values. There
may be a class of implicit IP values that are quite real and important
to particular societal groups, but that policymakers may be overlook-
ing because they are only implicit in the technological structures and
limitations of the past. Because this pattern is so common in IP, poli-
cymakers should be in the habit of asking: if an activity important to
IP governance was implicitly constrained by technological limitations
of the past, was this constraint simply a value-neutral vestige of earli-
er technological processes, or was it actually performing a valuable,
but implicit, functional role in protecting a value?
132. See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF LIBRARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 28, at 7-
8.
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1. Explicit IP Values and Rights
It is best to understand implicit Structural Values by contrasting
them against explicit legal values and rights. In this Article's usage,
an explicit value is one that is expressly enshrined in a positive law
source. For example, in real property law, the ability to exclude others
"is a fundamental aspect of private property ownership."133 That
property owners should be able to exclude others is a social value that
is protected by an explicit legal right and remedy based in positive
real property law. 134
Thus, when I state that a legal right or value is explicit, I mean to
emphasize two points. First, that the value or right is expressly articu-
lated in some readily identifiable authoritative legal text, such as a
statute or court opinion. Second, I mean to emphasize that the holder
of a legal right can use the legal system to prevent others from inter-
fering with the protected activity (e.g., possessing land).135 Thus, to
the extent that the law can be used to constrain others from interfering
with a particular activity, the law is providing an explicit legal right.
2. Implicit IP Structural Values
There is an analogy between the constraint provided by positive
law and the constraint provided by technological infeasibility. The
possessor of an explicit legal right can invoke a specific law to pre-
vent others from interfering with some valued activity such as pos-
sessing land. It is the ability to rely upon the legal system to prevent
others from interfering with one's performance of a valued activity
that makes a legal right effective. Analogously, in the Structural Val-
ue scenario, parties are relying upon technological infeasibility to im-
plicitly prevent others from interfering with some valued activity.
Insofar as they do so, they may be reliant upon an implicit "Structural
Right."
In other words, one can argue that there may be "shadow" IP
Structural Values and Rights embedded in the technological limita-
tions of the past. In the case of an explicit legal right, there is a pos-
133. See People v. Tapia, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 168 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal citation
omitted). See also Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); Restatement (First)
of Property § 7 (1936).
134. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-402 (West 2010) (articulating the Mary-
land limitations on the right to trespass).
135. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 717 21 (1916) (discussing theoretical concepts of affirmative
and negative legal rights).
136. Scholars have previously made similar arguments but they have tended to focus up-
on how intentional design choices of technological systems (e.g., websites, software, the
Internet) can foster or inhibit societal values. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 25, at 6 (arguing
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itive law empowering one party to prevent others from interfering
with a valued activity. By contrast, in certain IP contexts, it may only
be technological infeasibility, and not law, that is preventing others
from interfering with an activity valued by a societal group. Thus, one
might plausibly posit the existence of a shadow Structural Right em-
bedded in this arrangement, as technological feasibility may be, in
some cases, performing a constraining function and substituting for
positive law protection.
Thus, there is the possibility that technological infeasibility (i.e.,
high Technological Cost) may be implicitly protecting certain IP val-
ues. Using the earlier example, to the extent that the ability to lend
books did represent a valued activity, it has historically only been pro-
tected implicitly by the practical fact that copyright holders could not
technologically constrain what purchasers did with paper books. In
such scenarios, one can draw analogies between explicit legal rights
enshrined in positive law and implicit technological constraint. One
party (a copyright holder) is being prevented from interfering with
another party's valued activity (a borrower), except it is not law that is
doing the constraining, but technological infeasibility. That arrange-
ment arguably reflected an implicit value facilitated by the very struc-
ture and limitations of past technological environments.
The broader suggestion is that there may be similar non-obvious
IP Structural Values embedded in the infeasibility of the past techno-
logical contexts. The interests of certain societal groups may have
depended upon particular unwanted activities (e.g., restricting lend-
ing) being Technologically Costly and implicitly constrained. When a
group's core interests depend upon unwanted activities being inhibit-
ed by high Technological Cost, we can think of such technological
infeasibility as arguably implicitly "protecting" a Structural Value.137
It may actually be important to a societal group's interests that certain
activities that have historically been Technologically Costly continue
to remain costly and constrained.
3. Issues with IP Structural Values
To the extent that IP Structural Values are embedded in this way,
there are some unique issues worth emphasizing. First, because such
values are implicit, they are by definition not affixed in any unambig-
uous and explicit positive law source. One reason for the lack of af-
fixation is that if there is a valued activity (such as lending books) that
is already adequately being protected by technological infeasibility
(i.e., the technical inability to restrain paper book lending), also it is
that software code and design can effectively promote or inhibit values in electronically
mediated environments, such as the Internet).
137. See Surden, supra note 30, at 1613.
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unlikely to become enshrined explicitly in positive law text. We imag-
ine that lawmakers, with limited resources, do not bother enshrining
values in positive law that are already being sufficiently safeguarded
by technological infeasibility. To use the earlier example, even if
there was a consensus that lending books is a valuable activity that
should be protected, in the context of paper books, why would law-
makers have bothered creating an explicit legal rule to protect af-
firmatively lending when it was already technologically infeasible for
others to interfere with this activity? An explicit legal rule would have
been functionally superfluous. The end result is that such values re-
main only implicitly protected even if they reflect a genuine societal
consensus.
The implicit nature of such IP Structural Values creates others is-
sues. First, the very existence of an implicit value is contestable. Un-
like a value that is affirmatively expressed in positive law, the
existence of an implicit IP value can only be inferred from a historical
technological arrangement. The presence of an inferred value is sub-
ject to much more ambiguity and contestability than an explicit value.
In some cases, the fact that a certain activity of the past was Techno-
logically Costly and constrained may have been a value-neutral arti-
fact of some inefficient or underdeveloped process. Copyright holders
may reasonably argue that the inability to constrain lending in the pa-
per book context was simply a byproduct of primitive paper book
technology and did not actually reflect an embedded societal value.
However, even if contestable, the possibility that such implicit IP
Structural Values exist should not be dismissed out of hand simply
because they are ambiguous. This Article's analysis suggests that such
values may be very plausible and worthy of consideration. There may
very well be scenarios in which the very Technological Costliness of
an activity may reflect an embedded (but uncodified) social value
whose protection is not enshrined in positive law. Given the natural
tendency to observe the explicit over the implicit, there is the risk that
policymakers may overlook the very existence of bona-fide, but im-
plicit IP values.
Second, to the extent that IP Structural Values exist, they may be
subject to subtle "Technological Erosion." Technological Erosion
occurs when valuable activities that are only implicitly protected by
technological limitations lose protection when new technologies
emerge without the same limitations of the past. To the extent that
societal groups relied upon technological limitations to prevent others
implicitly from interfering with their interests, the emergence of new
technologies that are unconstrained by earlier limitations may subtly
138. Cf ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, 20 (2012) ("Developments in the
world of science and technology can unfold in radically unpredictable ways . . . ."); see also
supra Part IIA.
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cause such interests to dissipate passively. Because the functional role
of high Technological Cost is subtle, we might not fully understand
that such technological infeasibility was implicitly protecting values
until after those costs diminish, or in some cases, not at all.
B. Technological Erosion ofStructural Values
1. Structural Values in Privacy as an Example
As I have written elsewhere, privacy law offers vivid examples of
values embedded in the technological limits of the past.139 Such ex-
amples can illuminate analogous scenarios in IP law. Consider the
privacy of sensitive information in public court documents. Today,
many court records and documents of legal proceedings are digital
and stored in electronic form.140 However, prior to the year 2000,
most records of the documents and proceedings of a lawsuit were
printed on paper and physically stored in files at a courthouse or some
government archive. In that earlier physical era, it was not uncommon
for parties to litigation to include sensitive private information such as
social security numbers or income data in public court documents. 141
In that period, privacy was implicitly protected by technological
infeasibility. Consider a litigant who did not want a social security
number broadly revealed. Although sensitive information included in
a court document was nominally public in the paper era (as court doc-
uments, if not under seal, are generally public), the privacy of the in-
formation was practically protected by the high Technological Cost of
actually locating sensitive information in a public court filing. One
would first have to navigate a bureaucracy, including the clerk of the
court, to gain access to the physical docket file of a case. That file in
turn might contain many folders, each itself likely containing multiple
physical documents associated with that case.142 Given that a typical
case might have tens, if not hundreds, of separate documents (each
multiple pages in turn), the task of locating specific portions of private
information in a large stack of papers was formidable. In practical
139. For a more comprehensive treatment of the way privacy values may be implicitly
embedded in extant technological limitations, see Surden, supra note 30, at 1605-08.
140. Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to
Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REv. 772, 773-74 (2012).
141. See, e.g., Jennifer Greene, Competing Interests Regarding Electronic Court Rec-
ords: Privacy Versus Open Access in Arizona, 40 No. 3 JUDGES' J. 26, 28 (2001) (discuss-
ing the common use of social security numbers and other sensitive personal information in
court documents).
142. See Surden, supra note 30, at 1613 (describing how the Technological Cost of find-
ing private information in public court records before and after the electronic era revealed
that "Structural Constraints" rooted in technological limitations were implicitly protecting
privacy); see also Nancy S. Marder, From "Practical Obscurity" to Web Disclosure: A New,
Understanding ofPublic Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REv. 441, 444 (2009).
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terms, the Technological Cost of finding sensitive information in a
large paper docket file would have been prohibitive, requiring unrea-
sonable amounts of time and resources.
2. Structural Values and Technological Erosion
The court records example illustrates a Structural Value embed-
ded in prior technological infeasibility. In the era of paper documents,
it was Technologically Costly, if not entirely infeasible, to locate par-
ticular sensitive information in public paper court documents. From
this relationship of technological infeasibility, one may arguably infer
a shadow Structural Value and Right. The interests of a certain socie-
tal group (litigants) depended upon others not being able to locate
sensitive information. This interest was implicitly protected by the
technological infeasibility of actually locating such information. As
mentioned, lawmakers may be less likely to protect such an interest
explicitly that is already adequately implicitly protected by technolog-
ical infeasibility. However, to the extent that such an interest would
have otherwise been explicitly protected by a positive legal right had
technological infeasibility not adequately protected the interest, there
is a strong argument that this technological relationship reflected not
just a Structural Value, but a Structural Right embedded in the earlier
technological structure. 143
To the extent that such implicit Structural Rights and Values ex-
ist, they may be vulnerable to subtle Technological Erosion when
technology changes. In a familiar theme of this Article, in the case of
court records, two trends occurred over time: (1) court documents
were submitted in digital, rather than paper, form; and (2) these digit-
ized court records were made accessible over the Internet.144 While
the digitization and networked access of court records undoubtedly
proved a boon to efficiency, it had the unintended side effect of mak-
ing previously obscured private information suddenly accessible at
low cost.145 Sensitive information that had previously been obscure1 46
and hard to access in the physical world became readily found. 147
143. Cf Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity
for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REv. 921, 921-23 (2006) (discussing privacy regulation
near the inception of a new technology).
144. See Amanda Conley et al., supra note 140, at 773-74.
145. Marder, supra note 142, at 444.
146. See, e.g., Dwight R. Worley, The Gun Owner Next Door: What You Don't Know
About the Weapons in Your Neighborhood, THE JOURNAL NEWS (Dec. 24, 2012),
http://www.lohud.com/article/20121224/NEWSO4/312240045/ (describing the creation of a
map linking the addresses of people and public records indicating gun ownership).
147. There are other examples from the privacy world, in which sensitive information
which - nominally public in an earlier era - becomes exposed with the advent of technol-
ogy that reduces the costs of aggregating previously distributed data. These include online
maps linking the addresses of private individuals and information about those individuals -
for example campaign contributions, the amount paid for their home, and whether they own
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As a result of this technological change, Structural Values for pri-
vacy that had been embedded in the prior technological architecture
subtly eroded. Litigants had depended upon limitations inherent to
past technological environments to safeguard their privacy interests
implicitly. In other words, rather than relying upon an explicit legal
right to inhibit the privacy violating activities of others, litigants had
relied upon technological infeasibility to constrain how others implic-
itly could locate their sensitive information.148 However, when exter-
nal technological changes rendered what was previously infeasible,
feasible, the implicit protection for these Structural Values eroded.
Others gained the ability to interfere with privacy interests in ways
that had not previously been technologically possible. More generally,
this point illustrated that when there is a Structural Value that is only
implicitly protected by technological infeasibility; it may quietly dis-
sipate when a new technology eliminates the Structural Constraints of
the past that had been serving a functional role in safeguarding the
interest.149
In such a scenario, the emergence of technology is, in effect, sub-
tly, and by default, creating public policy. We normally think of pub-
lic policy as being consciously crafted and altered by lawmakers.
However, in the context of Structural Values, it is the widespread
emergence of a new technology that is, in effect, changing public pol-
icy. To the extent that societal groups relied upon limitations of past
technological environments implicitly to safeguard their interests, and
to the extent that the emergence of technology quietly removed these
limitations, such a reduction in protection is tantamount to a passive
shift in shadow values and rights.150 Following technological change,
certain societal groups may gain the technological ability to interfere
with the valued activities of other groups in ways that they previously
could not. This is, in essence, a change in public policy. Such a policy
change, however, is driven not by the conscious and active delibera-
tion of lawmakers, but passively by the external emergence of tech-
nology.
a gun. While such information was nominally public, the information was often in dispersed
locations (e.g., telephone company address database versus public deeds database) which
made aggregating and linking the information practically difficult. See Evan Selinger, Why
We Need New Rights to Privacy, SLATE (Nov. 2 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/future tense/2012/11/harrysurden suggests rfid and other tech advances
necessitate newprivacy.html.
148. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REv. 481, 522-24
(2009) (discussing practical obscurity protecting paper court records).
149. For a good illustration of this, see generally Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy:
The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REV.
1153 (2011), for a discussion of how the lowering of Technological Cost of disclosing per-
sonal information can change dynamics by which actors can signal marketplace infor-
mation.
150. See id.
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Importantly, following the emergence of a new technology, Struc-
tural Values may no longer be protected either by technological infea-
sibility or by positive law. One question is whether such implicit
values should be explicitly preserved by positive law, or by some oth-
er mechanism (e.g., technology). However, there is reason to believe
that the very existence (and erosion) of such Structural Values may
tend to be overlooked in the first place because policymakers may not
be accustomed to thinking of past costs or technological limitations as
performing a functional role. Economic costs are often considered
undesirable manifestations of some underlying inefficiency. Simi-
larly, high Technological Cost may, by default, be understood as
simply a manifestation of an inefficient and underdeveloped state of
technological advancement, and not as performing a functional role.
Thus, it may be easy for policymakers to dismiss the high Technolog-
ical Cost of activities in the past as mere byproducts of limited or inef-
ficient processes.
Because the functional role of high Technological Cost is subtle,
one might not fully understand that background technological limita-
tions were implicitly protecting values until after those costs dissipate,
or in some cases, not at all. However, one general lesson is that tech-
nological limitations and what others have elsewhere termed "fric-
152
tion" - may not simply be manifestations of inefficiency, but may
be serving some non-obvious functional role in a larger governance
framework. Here, we can understand high Technological Cost as
potentially serving the functional role of implicitly protecting social
values and abilities.154 Thus, policymakers may need priming to ob-
serve when technological infeasibility is implicitly protecting valued
activities.
Problematically for those who depend on such values, the fact
that the values were implicitly embedded in technological limits, ra-
ther than explicitly enshrined in law, poses a rhetorical and political
disadvantage. Groups are put in the position of advocating for explicit
protection for what may superficially appear to be a "new" legal right.
In fact, the underlying values may have long existed, protected im-
plicitly by technological infeasibility. Because such an implicit value
was never positively enshrined in law, it is vulnerable to ambiguity as
to whether it was truly an embedded social value, or simply a value-
neutral byproduct of the way that technology happened to have pro-
gressed. When a value is implicit this counterargument always exists.
151. See, Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 55-56 (6th ed. 2002).
152. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1193, 1285-86 (1998); Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Prag-
inatc Look at the Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 2, 22 (2000).
153. Surden, supra note 30, at 1605.
154. See id. at 1613.
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Many instances of high Technological Cost are simply manifestations
of inefficiency and do not necessarily represent latent values. This is a
significant ambiguity that is analytically difficult to entangle.
C. Technological Cost Protecting Values in IP
This same dynamic of embedded values exists in IP law. There
are arguably multiple IP values that have historically been protected,
not explicitly by positive law, but implicitly by high Technological
Cost. As emerging technologies reduce these costs, values that have
been important to particular groups have subtly eroded, possibly be-
neath the notice of lawmakers. Such groups are in the rhetorically
difficult position of advocating for positive legal protection for inter-
ests that they may have had implicitly for many years.
Consider the example of IP "exhaustion" legal doctrines. In pa-
tent law, legal rights should "exhaust" after the first authorized sale of
a product covered by a patent claim. This means that patent legal
rights cannot be used to restrict subsequent resale of a product that
embodies patented technology following an authorized sale. Copy-
right law has an analogous "first sale" doctrine that allows control
over the initial sale of a creative work but not resale of that work in
the aftermarket. Such exhaustion doctrines allow IP holders to prof-
it from the first sale of a good but not to legally control subsequent
resale by purchasers, thus permitting robust secondary markets for
used IP goods (e.g., secondhand bookstores).
In the past, when IP goods were primarily non-electronic, IP
owners could do little to detect or control use in the aftermarket once
their legal rights were exhausted. Similar to the book lending scenario
discussed earlier, copyright holders could not technologically detect
when purchasers resold paper books, nor could they technologically
constrain this activity. In patent law, the holder of patent rights simi-
larly could not technologically constrain or control the use of a typical
product embodying a patented invention once an authorized purchaser
possessed the product. The typical purchaser of a patented product
could thus resell that product without interference from the patent
holder because it was technologically infeasible for the patent holder
to constrain this activity.
155. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Plager, J., dissenting) ("The principle of 'first sale' . . . is that when a patent owner ... sells
to another a product which incorporates the patented invention, the other may convey the
product to third parties free of any claim of patent infringement.").
156. Id.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168
(W.D. Wash. 2008) ("Because a first sale exhausts the copyright holder's distribution right,
future distributions of the copy do not implicate the Copyright Act.").
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Embedded in this past technological infeasibility was arguably an
implied Structural Value that the public should be able to resell copy-
righted and patented goods without the interference of rights holders.
However, as books and other creative works have shifted to digital
form, and physical patented products increasingly contain embedded
electronics capable of controlling the products from afar, this implicit
value has subtly eroded. For example, copyright holders can now
technologically constrain the resale of purchased digital music in
ways that were previously infeasible.159 Similarly, patent holders can
now technologically constrain how certain patented goods (those with
embedded electronics) can be used after authorized purchasers pos-
sessed the goods. 1o It is conceivable that a patent holder could disable
the functionality of certain patented goods from afar if it is detected
that an item is resold without the permission of the patent holder.
Thus, one can plausibly argue that the technological infeasibility
of the past reflected an implicit Structural Value that copyright and
patent owners should not have as much control over their works as
technology now allows. If so, these implicitly protected values have
subtly eroded with technological change. The limitation from the ear-
lier technological era was arguably implicitly maintaining a desired IP
policy balance between access to, and control over, IP goods. To the
extent that such technological inability to control IP goods post-sale
reflected an embedded, implicit value, this value has likely eroded
since digital technology lowered the Technological Cost of post-sale
control of IP goods. 1 One argument that users might raise is that this
implicit Structural Value should now be explicitly preserved in posi-
tive law. 162
In another example, a similar argument might be raised in the
copyright fair use context. As discussed, copyright's fair use doctrine
permits a class of unauthorized uses of copyrighted works. 1 It has
historically been Technologically Costly for copyright holders to de-
tect when their creative works are being used for fair use purposes.
Even if detected, it has also been Technologically Costly for copyright
holders to interact with users and to do anything to constrain the
158. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REv. 577, 577 80 (2003) (discussing diminishing first sale rights in the digital age).
159. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REv. 889
(2011).
160. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 697 F.3d 387,
396 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing patented printer cartridge with electronics that only permit
use with printers authorized by patent holder).
161. Cf Gary Miller, On Federal Preemption of Contractual First Sale Waivers, 2010
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 90802, *5-6 (2010) (describing increased post-sale techno-
logical control over copyrighted works).
162. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra, note 159.
163. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at *33, *39-40 (2003)
(describing a wide range of fair uses).
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use.164 We can thus think of the high Technological Cost of detecting
fair uses and interacting with users as implicitly protecting a class of
unauthorized uses. In the analog world, certain users (e.g., a professor
showing a short film clip in class) can engage in a series of fair uses in
a relatively unconstrained fashion due to the technological infeasibil-
ity of detecting such a use.
With the transition to digital content, it is becoming easier for
copyright holders to detect and constrain fair uses. Additionally, as I
have argued elsewhere, certain Technological Costs of contracting are
beginning to decrease due to a host of emerging contracting technolo-
gies. 1 This decrease in the Technological Cost of detecting fair uses
may erode a class of unconstrained fair uses that had previously been
fostered by the technological infeasibility of constraining them. Some
of these uses may represent values that societal groups had historical-
ly depended upon and deemed important.166
In general, we can think of the high Technological Cost of the
past as having protected, in certain cases, important but implicit IP
values. It is crucial for policymakers to be cognizant of the fact that
the technological infeasibility of the past may have subtly masked
values that were important to core IP balances, and that these embed-
ded values may passively erode over time as previously infeasible
levels of control becomes technologically feasible.
Thus, the Technological Cost framework helps give a theoretical
structure to the intuitive understanding that users of IP goods have lost
certain abilities with technological change (e.g., lending books, resell-
ing music). This framework provides a rhetorical structure for articu-
lating that there may have been implicit, but genuine, values subtly
embedded in the limitations of past technological environments, and
whose passive diminishment policymakers should take seriously. In
such a case, a user could plausibly argue that the addition of an ex-
plicit legal right (e.g., an affirmative right to lend) would not consti-
tute the addition of a new IP right, but rather would be simply be
preserving a longstanding Structural Right that had existed for many
years implicitly embedded in the technological architectures of the
past but which has eroded.
There are a few points to clarify. The first is that if we are exam-
ining Structural Values from the standpoint of users, it is important to
note that decreases in Technological Cost can often benefit users by
enabling new activities as they simultaneously erode certain implicit
164. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1616 (1982).
165. See Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 629-30
(2012).
166. See Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 25, at 985; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra
note 21, at 91; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1089, 1090 (1998).
Technological Cost as Law
values. For example, technology can now enable users to engage in
more fair uses than they had historically, such as software tools that
allow the editing of videos or music. Thus, this part has focused only
upon how changes in Technological Cost can hurt users compared to a
historical technological baseline, but to be clear, changes in certain
types of Technological Cost can also help users.
Second, values are relative. From the perspective of a copyright
holder, the ability to control books and other creative works may be a
benefit, not a detriment. Thus, whether the erosion of a prior ability
represents the dissipation of Structural Value depends upon the view-
point taken. I do not mean to suggest that the implicit technological
constraint of the past necessarily reflects embedded IP values, but
rather that policymakers should take seriously the possibility that such
latent values embedded in past technological infeasibility might have
existed and may have passively eroded.
D. Replicating Implicit IP Values Explicitly
To the extent that Structural Values exist when technology
changes, such implicit values may be left unprotected either by law or
technology. The question then arises, should society continue to ac-
tively protect such values using an explicit means such as positive
legal right, or some other mechanism of regulation (e.g., technological
measures)? This is a question that is not, as a general matter, typically
addressed today, as policymakers are not accustomed to observe the
subtle process of Technological Erosion. However, the argument for
promulgating an explicit legal right is the strongest when it is clear
that some valued activity would have been protected by positive law
had technological infeasibility not so effectively safeguarded it.
One line of thinking suggests preserving the historical status quo
by continuing the balance of IP rights and duties that existed in the
previous technological era. For example, if high Technological Cost
traditionally inhibited post-sale control over patented or copyrighted
goods, according to this view society should continue to limit post-
sale control over goods using positive law, even after post-sale control
becomes technologically feasible. In the domain of privacy, such a
"status quo" preservation principle has been advocated by Helen Nis-
senbaum in dealing with analogous issues of technological change
shifting longstanding, embedded privacy values.167
While a major point of this Article is that it is crucial to recognize
when implicit rights have eroded, I do not think that the status quo
preservation principle is necessarily apt in the IP context. Emerging
technologies may lower costs and as a by-product erode rights that
167. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 145
(2004).
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were only implicitly protected by costs. Yet emerging technologies
can also enable novel welfare enhancing activities as well. A default
preservation of historical allocations risks over-inclusiveness, quelling
beneficial activities along with unwanted activities. Another problem
is that the balance that had been rendered by the historical path of
technological advancement might be, in part, arbitrary and not neces-
sarily the allocation that would have been chosen with conscious fore-
thought.
Rather, my suggested approach is process oriented, rather than
normative. IP policymakers should actively pay attention to the way
in which values may have been embedded in prior technological ar-
chitectures, and the way activities that were valuable to earlier societal
groups were implicitly protected by technological infeasibility. Fol-
lowing a significant technological change, lawmakers should return to
basic IP principles for re-evaluation, determining whether IP incen-
tives are still being adequately fostered, and uses of IP goods are still
being adequately preserved. However, currently it appears that the
potential existence of Structural Values tends to be overlooked be-
cause such values are implicit rather than explicit.
Problematically, the emergence of technology often ends up mak-
ing default public policy allocations concerning IP values. For exam-
ple, the emergence of digital books has effectively enabled copyright
holders to technologically constrain lending post-sale. However,
whether or not lending represents a valued activity that should be le-
gally protected is a matter of public policy and should be decided ac-
tively through deliberation by lawmakers, not passively by
technological emergence. Today, however, such IP public policy allo-
cations are often rendered, by default, when a new technology emerg-
es that permits increased control over IP goods as compared to the
past. A better approach is a deliberate and considered weighing of the
costs and balances of new technologies and whether certain valued
activities of the past should or should not be protected. Allowing the
emergence of technology to render default legal allocations is an arbi-
trary and passive form of policymaking.
IV. A THEORETICAL VIEW OF TECHNOLOGICAL COST IN IP
A. Implicit IP Regulation by Technological Cost
This Part explores in more depth how IP legal frameworks can be
understood, from a theoretical perspective, to rely upon high Techno-
logical Cost to maintain balances that are central to IP governance.
This understanding is different from the usual view of costs, which
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are often understood as passive manifestations of inefficient processes
and not as performing a functional role.168
1. An Abstract View of Regulation and Regulatory Theory
Legal regulation involves influencing the behavior of individuals
or organizations through threatened legal consequences or instruc-
tion. However, under an approach made prominent by Lawrence
Lessig, lawmakers are encouraged to consider other factors, whether
based in law or not, that are also capable of influencing the activities
or behaviors of societal actors.170 According to scholars of this genre,
we should understand law to be but one among many modalities that
can incentivize or constrain the activities of societal actors.171
There is thus a broader class of regulatory mechanisms, aside
from law, that society can potentially use to promote or constrain par-
ticular activities. Under Lessig's typology, we can classify regulatory
mechanisms into four broad categories: law, social norms, market
pricing, and physical/technological architectures.172 To this list I
would add: institutional design , "choice architectures" (or similar
174approaches based upon human cognitive tendencies) , enforcement
procedures, and organizational or industry practices. These are all
factors that have the effect of influencing the behavior of societal enti-
ties. "Non-Legal Regulators" are those mechanisms listed above, such
as physical architectures, which are external to law in the sense that
they do not themselves directly employ positive law or legal institu-
tions as their means of influencing behavior.175
168. For articles discussing ways in which costs play functional roles, see Victor
Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REv. 227, 232-33 (2010) (discussing how
"frictions" can be used as a tool to encourage tax compliance) and Jonathan S. Masur, Cost-
ly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 687 (2010) (discussing the
way in which patent application costs functionally screen low-valued patents).
169. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1985).
170. Lessig, supra note 30, at 661.
171. Id; cf Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (discussing deterrence of crime as a function of all expected costs
and benefits).
172. Lessig, supra note 30, at 661-63.
173. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 168, at 283-84 (showing how institutional design af-
fects regulatory arbitrage).
174. For a discussion as to how the framing of legal and non-legal structures can influ-
ence decisions in light of knowledge about human cognitive processes, see On Amir & Orly
Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: Hoiw Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 2098, 2098 (2008), and see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
(2009).
175. Lessig notes that positive laws may regulate Non-Legal Regulators. Thus, for exam-
ple, a law that imposes a tax on a good is a law (a legal regulator) altering a price (a Non-
Legal Regulator). Therefore, the distinction between legal and Non-Legal Regulators is not
always so discrete. Lessig, supra note 30, at 662-64.
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This scholarship emphasizes the importance of considering Non-
Legal Regulators in crafting legal policy. In some contexts it is not
law but a factor external to law that is the predominant influence over
an activity. In those contexts, the most significant considerations may
involve Non-Legal Regulatory mechanisms. By tendency, lawmakers
may focus principally on legal regulation through statute, case law, or
administrative rule. However, effective policymaking requires consid-
ering the broader regulatory context in which the effects of Non-Legal
Regulators (e.g., social norms) might dominate the effects of legal
regulation. In other words, sound lawmaking cannot occur in a vacu-
um but must take into account other significant modalities affecting
behavior, whether based in legal rules or not.177
One principle drawn from viewing "regulation" abstractly is that
regulation is often achieved through imposing (or reducing) costs
(metaphorically) along some dimension. Making some behavior or
activity more difficult - physically, psychologically, technologically,
legally, or economically - is a means of constraining behavior. Laws
often regulate by imposing the threat of sanctions or other legal con-
sequences; these are the "legal costs" of violating the law. Social
norms impose social costs such as disapproval for those who violate
them. Similarly, physical architectures, such as fences, can make it
physically costly to go from one place to another. Cost has the effect
of inhibiting behavior, and the general lesson is that we can think
about just about anything that imposes costs as potentially playing a
regulatory role.
2. Technological Cost Can Play an Implicit Regulatory Role
Using this abstract understanding of regulation as making an ac-
tivity more or less difficult, we can understand Technological Cost as
implicitly regulating IP goods. Just as law modulates the prevalence
of activities by imposing legal costs, technological limitations regulate
implicitly because certain activities will be technologically con-
strained given the state of technological development of an era. Core
IP policy balances, reflected in the expression of positive IP laws,
implicitly depend on an assumption that certain activities that are
Technologically Costly will remain costly.
176. See id at 661.
177. See THALER& SUNSTEIN, supra note 174, at 5-6.
178. See Lessig, supra note 30, at 662; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912 (1996).
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B. Technological Cost and IP Governance Structures
1. Balance Is Crucial to IP Law
Implicit regulation by Technological Cost is best understood
within the context of policy balances that are central to all IP legal
regimes, such as the one described earlier in the sound recording and
photocopying contexts.179 IP policymakers are thought to spend con-
siderable effort crafting IP laws that strike deliberate balances be-
tween conflicting societal interests. The underlying justification for IP
law is generally agreed to be utilitarian in nature. Exclusive IP legal
rights - whether in copyright, patent, trademark, or trade secret -
are justified only to the extent that the net benefits that they give to
society outweigh the net costs that they impose. For example, patent
law's exclusive rights over inventive ideas are justified in the belief
that such rights promote the creation and commercialization of inven-
tions and the disclosure of ideas that might not otherwise have oc-
curred absent legal exclusivity.181 Similarly, exclusive rights in
copyright are thought to promote the creation of creative works that
authors would not otherwise be incentivized to develop. 182 Thus, in-
herent in the notion of a utilitarian justification in law is a balancing
of net social benefits against net social costs.183
IP laws frequently trade off the legal rights of IP owners against
the access and use rights of non-owners (i.e., the public). Because IP
law gives private legal rights over intangible information that would
otherwise be easily copied, distributed, and broadly used by the pub-
lic, control over information is often a zero-sum game. For example,
patent law is concerned with providing incentives for inventors to
develop fundamental, pioneering inventions, such as the telegraph1 84
or DNA sequences for therapeutic targets. 185 However, "upstream"
incentives in the form of exclusive rights to control ideas may inhibit
the ability of "downstream" researchers to develop, improve, and
commercialize inventions beyond the extent developed by the original
inventor. As discussed, copyright has similar concerns with exclu-
179. See supra Part I and Part II.A.2.
180. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1597; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare . . .
181. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
182. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12-14 (2003).
183. See generally William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REv. 341, 378,
391 (2013) (assessing the value of protectionist patent law and expedited examinations in
industry areas based on a cost-benefit analysis).
184. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
185. See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
186. See Lemley, supra note 31, at 990-91.
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sive rights discouraging creative works that build upon earlier works,
or inhibiting other values, such as free speech or scholarship.187
If IP laws strike the wrong balance there is the risk that IP laws
will do more net harm than good, and thus will not serve the underly-
ing utilitarian justification. IP rights that are too strong or too broad
may inhibit the ability of non-holders to use abstract ideas, and may,
on net, impose more costs than the benefits that they bring. For exam-
ple, if DNA synthesis is merely the first step to a very costly and dif-
ficult research path of creating a useful medical therapy, then granting
broad pioneering patent rights to those who merely identify initial
DNA markers might unduly inhibit downstream research required to
create a usable medical therapy. Similarly, copyright laws that are
unduly strong might inhibit the ability of the public to access and
transform creative works into new and socially beneficial products,
and may result in less, rather than more creation.
On the contrary, IP regimes must not be so weak as to undermine
fundamental economic incentive structures. IP incentives work when
the holders of exclusive legal rights can appropriate the value of their
works in the commercial marketplace backed by the threat of legal
remedy against unauthorized users. If the ability to capture value in
the commercial market is undermined, IP rights may not effectively
incentivize creation.189 For example, if a fair use rule allows unlimited
duplications for research purposes, and the technological emergence
of photocopying machines enables research departments to copy at
such an extensive scale so as to undermine the commercial market for
books and articles, policymakers might be concerned. Similarly, if
patent laws did not permit firms to recoup their research investments,
the creation of new technological knowledge might be under-
incentivized. Thus, IP policy represents, in theory at least, a series of
carefully calibrated regulatory equilibria that attempt to balance suffi-
cient incentives to invent, create, or invest in quality IP goods against
the costs that exclusive legal rights impose on improvement, free
speech, or other socially beneficial uses by non-owners.
2. IP Frameworks Depend Upon Technological Cost To Maintain
Balances
The balancing of competing policy interests is thus crucial to the
regulation of IP goods. IP legal frameworks sometimes depend upon
Technological Cost to functionally preserve central regulatory balanc-
es. In this way, we can understand high Technological Cost to be
playing an implicit, but crucial, regulatory role. When Technological
187. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
188. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
189. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 182, at 13.
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Costs decrease, the central governance equilibria upon which IP legal
frameworks implicitly depend can be disrupted. Several earlier exam-
ples illustrate this point.
Recall the sound recording example from the introduction. 190
Modern federal copyright law generally gives authors of creative
works (e.g., books, paintings, and movies) exclusive legal rights to
restrict copying of those works. 191 However, for much of the twentieth
century, federal copyright law did not give the creators of sound re-
cordings (e.g., music albums) the right to restrict others from making
copies of sound recordings. Meanwhile, federal copyright law of that
era did allow the authors of other types of creative works exclusive
legal rights in their creations.
One reason why federal rights over sound recordings did not ar-
rive until 1972 was that for many years high Technological Cost ef-
fectively limited the impact of unauthorized copies of sound
recordings.192 The general justification for exclusive legal rights over
duplicating creative works is that, absent such control, authors will
not be able to capture the value of their creations in the market, and
will therefore not have incentive to produce books, movies, or the like
in the first place.193 Without exclusive rights to restrict copying others
will "free ride" off the work and copy or sell the work at a lower price
(i.e., marginal cost) than could be charged by the creator,194 who in-
curred up-front costs to create the product that copiers did not. In the
early part of the twentieth century, Technological Cost, not law, effec-
tively mitigated the commercial market problem. The Technological
Cost of duplicating music albums in the early 1900s was high because
it was practically infeasible to create albums given the limited access
to sound recording duplicating methods of the era; the poor quality of
the copies further deterred duplication. The constraint imposed by
these Technological Costs preserved the economic incentives to cre-
ate. 195
A similar story of Technological Cost as part of an integral IP
balance occurred in the earlier scenario involving the Research Doc-
trine and photocopying described earlier.196 In the early twentieth cen-
tury, the high Technological Cost of duplication allowed fair use rules
190. See supra Part 1.
191. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
192. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553
(1985).
193. Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 330-31.
194. Id.
195. The limited state of duplication technology in the early twentieth century permitted
a small amount of unauthorized, but valuable public uses of sound recordings. The duplica-
tion of sound recordings of orphaned works by jazz enthusiasts was one example. Glenn M.
Reisman, The War Against Record Piracy: An Uneasy Rivalry Between the Federal and
State Governments, 39 ALB. L. REv. 87, 89 (1974).
196. Supra Part II.A.
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to permit scholarly researchers to make unauthorized duplications of
copyrighted work without explicit limitations in a way that did not
threaten the core copyright balance. The natural constraints of early
duplication technology - hand transcription and the "photostat ma-
chine" - inherently maintained an equilibrium between competing
copyright goals. The Research Doctrine was structured upon unstated
presumptions of high Technological Cost. Because the legal scope of
the fair use rule was subtly linked to the external state of technologi-
cal development, the doctrine underwent a shift in Effective Scope
when the Technological Cost of copying decreased. The Research
Doctrine had been framed in an era of background technological limi-
tations that no longer applied.
Similarly, the Google Book Search example described earlier ex-
emplifies the way in which high Technological Cost had previously
maintained an implicit equilibrium between appropriation of value by
IP creators and permission-free uses of IP goods by the public. 197 In
the era of paper documents, Embedded Excerpts fostered socially
beneficial uses such as criticism or scholarship without diminishing
the ability of copyright holders to capture the value of their books on
the market. As described, the display of digital, online excerpts in the
context of Google Books substitutes for some commercial functions
of the original text. Thus, for certain purposes - such as citation
checking - a mere glance at a snippet or excerpt is sufficient to
achieve a purpose that previously required physical access to the
book.
To summarize the argument: (1) under regulatory theory we can
understand anything that imposes "costs" on an activity to be a regula-
tory factor; (2) certain activities central to IP equilibria have histori-
cally been functionally constrained by high Technological Cost;
(3) we can understand Technological Cost to play an implicit regula-
tory role, alongside positive IP law, in constraining activities relevant
to the governance of IP goods; (4) when innovation lowers the Tech-
nological Cost of these activities, policy balances at the core of posi-
tive IP legal structures may be disrupted.
3. Positive Law and Implicit Link to Technological Cost
The positive expression of IP laws - what courts or legislatures
promulgate and commit to authoritative legal texts - often reflects
unstated assumptions about Technological Cost. This relationship is
demonstrated as much by what is included in the positive text as by
what is conspicuously omitted. For example, the Research Doctrine,
which permitted unauthorized duplications of written materials for
197. Supra Part I.B.
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research purposes, contained no explicit restrictions in its early twen-
tieth-century expression. The absence of such scope restrictions re-
flected an assumption that the Technological Cost of duplication was
understood to be high and believed to remain high. Since the Techno-
logical Cost of copying was high, positive IP law did not need to in-
clude explicit restrictions on scope.
The important point is that positive IP law, both explicit legal
rules as articulated, and omissions from positive IP law, develops in
the shadow of prevailing Technological Cost. The conspicuous omis-
sion of copyright protection for sound recording exemplifies a similar
dynamic. Positive IP legal frameworks' inclusions (legal categories
chosen) or omissions (scope limitations) implicitly reflect assump-
tions about technological feasibility. The activities that are regulated
are those that do not appear, at the time, to be capable of changes in
Technological Cost or feasibility. However, later technological ad-
vancement reveals this to be, in fact, inaccurate.
C. Identify and Predict
Lawmakers should thus be concerned about IP legal frameworks
that implicitly depend upon high Technological Cost to regulate. In
such an arrangement, carefully crafted regulatory balances can be-
come destabilized and susceptible to shifts when technology changes.
Lawmakers should aim to actively identify, ex-ante, current IP regula-
tory arrangements that are implicitly dependent upon high Technolog-
ical Cost. In service of this goal, this next Part suggests analytical
approaches to identify current technological dependencies in IP law.
In general, the method is to identify activities that are currently Tech-
nologically Costly but are likely to see a decrease in Technological
Cost in the near term, impacting the scope of IP law.
1. Cost and Constraint Focused Analysis
The first approach to identifying hidden dependencies of law up-
on Technological Cost is to focus upon existing Structural Con-
straints. One method is to imagine a hypothetical world of zero
constraints. What activities regulated by IP laws are implicitly techno-
logically constrained today? What would change in IP law if limita-
tions inherent to today's technologies were to suddenly disappear? For
instance, as of the writing of this Article, data bandwidth limitations
prevent certain video copyright activities from occurring on a broad
scale. Some IP regulatory structures may actually, but implicitly, de-
pend upon the high Technological Cost manifested by today's band-
width limitations. Thus, the imaginary lens of zero constraints
approximates what emerging technologies have tended to do to past
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Structural Constraints. They have, as a primary or side effect, broadly
reduced Technological Cost levels, making activities that were previ-
ously difficult and constrained, less so.
We can use this thought experiment to identify existing IP legal
structures that subtly depend upon high Technological Cost. For ex-
ample, what would change in patent, copyright, trade secret, or trade-
mark law, if bandwidth became unlimited and data transmission
instantaneous? Or, how would it fundamentally shift the current IP
legal regimes if data that is today stored separately in disconnected
data centers suddenly became centralized and costless to aggregate
and analyze? If physical objects that are today costly to produce were
instead costless to create, how would this shift IP equilibria? This
thought experiment reveals hidden dependencies that emerging tech-
nologies will likely disrupt, reducing constraints that pervade the cur-
rent system. Thus, to understand where IP laws might be vulnerable is
to envision a world without the Structural Constraints that exist today.
This process helps to reveal presumptions of high Technological Cost
that are embedded in the structure of current IP laws.
2. Technology Focused Analysis
The second approach is to focus upon technologies that will
emerge in the near term. This approach, unlike the one above, is tech-
nology focused, rather than constraint focused. This technique should
be used in tandem with the one above for identifying current techno-
logical dependencies in IP law. By examining emerging technologies,
we have a guide to the types of costs that might be dissipating in the
near future. Part V takes this approach by examining how three-
dimensional printing technology is reducing the Technological Cost
of manufacturing complex physical objects, as well as how certain
patent and copyright laws may be premised upon unarticulated pre-
sumptions that the Technological Cost of manufacturing goods is
high.198 This is an example of focusing upon an emerging technology
as a guide to Technological Costs that might be reduced in the near
future and predicting the impact on law.
3. Principles for Identifying Technological Dependencies
It is possible to come up with general principles by which activi-
ties appear to decrease in Technological Cost. These principles can
help illuminate the way in which current laws may subtly depend up-
on high Technological Cost by giving a guide to the dimensions along
which activities have tended to shift with technological change. We
198. See infra Part V.A (applying the technology focused technique, alongside the cost-
focused technique, with respect to three-dimensional printing).
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can examine current IP law along these dimensions to understand the
way in which they might shift with future technological change.
One common theme from the earlier examples has concerned
technology decentralizing the production and duplication of IP
goods.199 The creation of records, for example, has historically re-
quired expensive equipment that could only be operated economically
by professional firms with centralized operations.200 Technology has
tended to lower the costs of producing and replicating IP products,
allowing broad classes of non-professionals to produce these goods in
physically dispersed venues with low-cost equipment. Personal print-
ers, photocopiers, and word-processing technology illustrate this
trend. Part V discusses how three-dimensional printing continues this
trend in the context of physical goods.
Technology has also tended to reduce the quality gap between
consumer and professional output. Consumer equipment has often
crossed a threshold in which the goods produced have become suffi-
ciently suitable for many purposes, even if not matching the quality of
professional tools.201 Technology has often eliminated quality defi-
ciencies that limited the commercial impact of unauthorized uses of IP
goods made by non-industrial grade equipment, as was discussed ear-
lier in the context of copying sound recordings.
Technology has also undermined those IP laws linked to physical
location.202 Certain laws are structured upon the assumption that regu-
lated goods, actors, or activities will be anchored to certain physical
locations - so called "locus-based" presumptions.203 Historically,
copyright infringers have required physical U.S. operations to produce
or import products impacting the domestic commercial market.204
However, the advent of the Internet has permitted infringers to have
the majority of their operations physically outside U.S. jurisdictions,
while still able to impact the domestic market.205 Similarly, copyright
law has historically regulated creative works that were physically pos-
sessed by an end user, and which were embodied in a single object
199. Supra Part 1, Part II.B.2.
200. Note, supra note 9, at 44.
201. The quality of MP3 and other lossy music compression technology is not as good as
professional lossless audio, but has turned out to be sufficient for many purposes. Eric Ber-
ger, The Legal Problems ofthe MP3, 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 1-4 (1999).
202. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for
Offering in the United States To Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 701
(2004).
203. See, e.g., Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 387
(9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the difficulties in determining the "locus" or location where
copyright infringement actually occurred).
204. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millenni-
um, " 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 163 (1999) (discussing difficulties with foreign
infringers and the Internet).
205. Tom W. Bell, Pirates in the Family Room: How, Performances fromn Abroad, to U.S.
Consumers, Might Evade Copyright Law, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L. 245, 248-50 (2011).
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found in a specific location (e.g., a paper book). However, technology
has enabled copyrighted works to be disaggregated and divided into
distinct subcomponents in physically dispersed locations to be re-
aggregated electronically upon demand.206 As information has moved
away from specific locations and toward "cloud-based" network ser-
vices, physical possession of IP products is no longer necessary, nor
must all the components of an IP product be physically located in one
place. 207 Technology has thus undermined historical presumptions
tying IP activities to specific physical locations.
Additionally, technological change has brought about shifts in
speed of analysis, miniaturization, and monitoring. Things that previ-
ously used to require manual analysis, or for which computerized
analysis was expensive and slow, may become meaningfully faster or
instantaneous to analyze.208 Certain IP laws may be structured upon
the assumption that analysis that has historically been slow will con-
tinue to be slow, but increases in the speed of analysis may lead to
differences of kind rather than degree.
Furthermore, physical objects that have historically been non-
electronic in nature are appearing in fully electronic form. Others are
having electronics partially embedded within them. This inclusion of
remotely accessible and controllable electronics in objects that have
historically been non-electronic may bring about shifts. For example,
sensors are allowing the ability to monitor and remotely control phys-
ical devices in ways that were not technologically possible in the past
when everyday objects did not contain electronic, networked compo-
nents. Such technological trends have tended to grant IP owners in-
creased control over the use of products embodying IP. For example,
copyright holders can control the use and disposal of electronic books
in ways that were not technologically possible in the era of physical
books. Similarly, physical products increasingly contain electronic
sensors that may allow patent holders to remotely control or monitor
how distant purchasers actually use their products.209
206. See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (discussing BitTorrent and the decentralized and subcomponent nature of dis-
tributing data).
207. See Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459, 1500-01 (2008).
208. See, e.g., Alice Roberts, The Fruit Fly: Our Ancestor of 800 Million Years, THE
OBSERVER, Aug. 18, 2013, at 22. ("In the 1970s, geneticists began to sequence genes, labo-
riously at first, then with increasing speed as more ofthe process was automated.").
209. See, e.g., Mohana Ravindranath, Building the "Internet of Things," WASH. POST
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/building-the-
internet-of-things/2013/08/29/e3fbclae-1024-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html (de-
scribing how everyday products will increasingly contain embedded electronics that allow
them to be controlled remotely); Dan Sorensen, The Future Is Now: Building a Better World
iwith the Internet of Things, UTAH BUSINESS (October 8, 2013),
http://www.utahbusiness.com/articles/view/the future is now.
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Information that has historically been difficult to access is in-
creasingly becoming accessible due to technology. Moreover, a num-
ber of societal activities are occurring through electronically mediated
contexts (i.e., through computer systems) that used to take place in
physical forums or involving tangible objects with inherent physical
constraints. The Google Books Search project illustrates this point. To
the extent that additional goods existing today only in physical or ana-
log form can in the future become digitized, this is another likely di-
mension of change.
These principles, along with the methods discussed above, can
help identify existing laws likely to contain technological dependen-
cies. To the extent that laws exhibit some of the themes above (i.e.,
rely upon premises that technological emergence has tended to un-
dermine) they may be vulnerable to technological shift.
V. APPLYING THE TECHNOLOGICAL COST MODEL
This part will demonstrate how applying the Technological Cost
framework to contemporary IP topics can clarify certain issues. To
recap, the framework posits that IP laws are often premised upon un-
stated assumptions that certain activities will be Technologically
Costly and thereby will be implicitly constrained by limitations inher-
ent to contemporary technologies. When the Technological Cost of
these activities fall, and existing Structural Constraints dissipate, there
can be shifts in the impact of IP legal structures.
A. Technological Cost as a Predictive Framework
The Technological Cost framework can be used for prediction.
This part will first examine how an emerging technology - three-
dimensional ("3-D") printing - is reducing the Technological Cost of
producing and transmitting physical objects. It will then illustrate how
one can identify current IP legal structures that are premised upon
unstated presumptions of high Technological Cost. Current patent and
copyright laws, for example, are structured upon the premise that the
production of physical objects will be implicitly constrained by tech-
nological limitations common today. We can observe how laws
framed in an earlier technological context are likely to undergo sub-
stantive shifts as 3-D printing undermines the presumptions of Tech-
nological Costliness upon which these were based. Viewing this
change through the lens of Technological Cost allows us to predict
and understand upcoming changes in the law, such as an increasing
importance of secondary liability in copyright and patent law.
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1. 3-D Printing and Changes in Technological Cost
Let us examine how 3-D printing is reducing the Technological
Cost of creating complex physical objects. 3-D printing is an emerg-
ing technology that allows for the rapid production of physical objects
from electronic designs.210 Unlike traditional printers that produce
two-dimensional output on paper, 3-D printers can produce three-
dimensional physical objects such as parts for machines.211 NASA, for
example, has used 3-D printing technology to produce components for
rocket engines.212 The technology is also widely used in rapid proto-
typing, enabling firms to print early-stage product samples with the
physical shape of end products.213
In a typical design process, a user first creates a three-
dimensional computer model of the object to be printed using com-
puter aided design ("CAD") software. The software then translates the
on-screen representation of the object into a set of precise, physical
attributes which are stored in an electronic computer file.21 A 3-D
printer can read such a specification file to produce an accurate, phys-
ical version of the electronically designed object using a prototyping
material such as plastic or metal.215 Although there are different 3-D
printing techniques, in the typical "additive" process, the 3-D printer
abstractly divides a 3-D design into very thin horizontal layers.216 The
printer produces the physical object by precisely "printing" or adding
one thin layer on top of another, with each layer conforming to the
particular physical measurements specified in the design file. The ul-
timate result is a physical object - such as a plastic machine part
that matches the exact dimensions specified.
Recent changes in 3-D printing technology are increasingly al-
lowing non-professionals to create complex physical objects that
would have previously required complex manufacturing facilities.
First, while 3-D printers were previously relegated to professional
machine departments due to cost and size, low-cost, high-quality,
small-footprint "personal" 3-D printers, situated in the price range of
ordinary consumers, are starting to emerge.217 Large numbers of non-
210. RENDOW YEE, ARCHITECTURAL DRAWING: A VISUAL COMPENDIUM OF TYPES AND
METHODS 96 (2012).
211. BRIAN EVANS, PRACTICAL 3D PRINTERS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF 3D PRINTING
xxiii (2012).
212. Larry Greenemeier, NASA Plans for 3-D Printing Rocket Engine Parts Could Boost
Larger Manufacturing Trend, SCL AM. (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=nasa-3-d-printing-sls-rocket-engine.
213. See KENNETH COOPER, RAPID PROTOTYPING TECHNOLOGY: SELECTION AND
APPLICATION § 1.1 (2001).
214. ANDERSON, supra note 37, at 90-91.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 91.
217. This technology has historically been relegated to centralized machine departments
because of the expense of the equipment. See id. at 92-95; EVANS, supra note 211, at xxiii.
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professional users are increasingly able to produce physical objects
that conform to precise physical specifications.218 Second, it has be-
come increasingly easy to send electronic specifications of objects to
distant recipients.219 One can transmit a particular specification to tens
of thousands of 3-D printer owners simultaneously, in dispersed loca-
tions around the world, at very little cost. In principle, each recipient
should be able to make a precise, physical duplication of the object
specified. The ability to quickly and simultaneously disseminate and
reproduce exact replicas of physical objects, at a distance and on a
mass scale, is a previously infeasible activity enabled by 3-D printing
technology.
The emergence of 3-D printing technology may thus significantly
reduce the Technological Cost of creating complex physical objects in
the near future. Historically, the manufacturing of complex products is
an activity that has been Technologically Costly - Structurally Con-
strained by technological limitations that tended to relegate this activi-
ty to sophisticated manufacturing facilities such as factories.220
2. Presumptions of Technological Cost in Current IP Law
Applying this Article's lens, we can understand that current IP le-
gal structures are premised upon the Technological Costliness of pro-
ducing, duplicating, and disseminating complex physical objects. This
part demonstrates how it is possible to recognize these legal-
technological dependencies ex ante, before a technology, such as 3-D
printing, has fully emerged.
One significant source of existing dependencies is the incentive
structure of both patent and copyright law. Patent law is architected so
that the creators of inventions can agropriate the value of their in-
ventive contributions in the market. Inventions are often costly to
develop, but relatively easy to copy once developed.222 The concern is
that inventors, absent patent law, will not be able to recoup their re-
search costs in the market. Copying competitors will be able to sell
the product at near marginal cost and will be at an advantage to the
218. See EVANS, supra note 211, at xxiii.
219. See, e.g., HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEw WORLD OF 3D
PRINTING 18-19 (2013).
220. Id. at 46.
221. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024 25 (1989) ("The incentive to
invent theory holds that too few inventions will be made in the absence of patent protection
because inventions once made are easily appropriated by competitors of the original inven-
tor who have not shared in the costs of invention.").
222. See id.
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original inventor because they will not have borne the research and
development costs.223
For example, consider a firm that has spent considerable amounts
of research, development, and clinical testing funds to create a medi-
cal device.224 Once that device has been designed and tested, competi-
tors seeking to copy the device can often reverse engineer the design
at relatively low cost. While the inventing firm needs to recoup its
development costs, a copying firm would not incur these development
costs and thus be able to sell the same device at a lower price. Patent
law aims to prevent such free riding through legal exclusivity. The
inventing firm can use patent rights to exclude free-riding competitors
from selling products that are covered by their claims, thus allowing
the firm to capture the value of their invention in the marketplace.
Embedded in patent law's economic model is an underlying
premise about the Technological Costliness of manufacturing prod-
ucts that is revealed if we imagine the cost of decentralized manufac-
turing falling to zero. To manufacture a sophisticated product such as
a medical device generally requires the resources of a firm with ad-
vanced manufacturing, production, distribution, and selling capabili-
225ties. Such production abilities are, for most advanced products,
typically outside the range of non-professional individuals. Often cre-
ating complex products necessitates sophisticated and centralized pro-
duction facilities and other resources.
The high Technological Cost of manufacturing complex products
has an effect of implicit constraint that is crucial to the patent legal
model. The number of entities who have the technical (and logistical)
sophistication to produce complex infringing products on a scale dis-
ruptive enough to affect the economics of the market is often implicit-
ly limited to those that can invest in the necessary manufacturing
equipment. This, in turn, means that the pool of potential defendants
to consider in a patent infringement lawsuit is often relatively con-
strained. This relatively limited pool of potential defendants is crucial
to the effectiveness of exclusive patent rights. A firm can often identi-
fy and sue the most important patent infringers - those firms with the
factories and distribution capacity to actually disrupt the commercial
market - and thereby use the legal system to constrain these defend-
ants. In other words, patent holders today may have a reasonable
223. See id. at 1025 ("If successful inventions are quickly imitated by free riders, compe-
tition will drive prices down to a point where the inventor receives no return on the original
investment in research and development.").
224. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1564 n.36 (2006) (noting clinical trial
costs in the hundreds of millions in the closely related field of pharmaceutical drugs).
225. ANDRES DIAZ LANTADA, HANDBOOK OF ACTIVE MATERIALS FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES: ADVANCES AND APPLICATIONS 3 (2011) (describing the complexity of manufac-
turing many medical devices).
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chance of detecting infringement and pursuing meaningful legal ac-
tion when the universe of entities that can pose an economically seri-
ous threat by infringing a patent is implicitly constrained due to the
high Technological Cost of manufacturing and distributing complex
physical products.
The high Technological Cost of manufacturing products performs
an implicit substantive role in the current patent legal framework. The
current structure of patent law is dependent upon relationships of im-
plicit constraint by existing technological limitations. The amount of
resources currently required to produce many sophisticated physical
objects often has the side effect of constraining the number of signifi-
cant defendants to a reasonably manageable level. However - if the
Technological Cost of manufacturing complex products decreased
significantly - there may be practical issues with the patent legal
system as a means to appropriate the value of inventions. 3-D printing
technology will potentially lower the Technological Cost of consum-
ers, or small firms, producing complex physical objects and thereby
undermine a core premise that is currently embedded in the structure
of patent law. If the ability to create physical objects becomes decen-
tralized and available to non-professional individuals in ways not
technologically feasible today, the class of putative defendants may
enlarge so as to make patent legal action ineffective.
Multiple individuals possessing 3-D printers may be able to create
useable reproductions of sophisticated patented objects, such as medi-
cal devices, in decentralized locations such as private homes. Moreo-
ver, certain products that today require physical shipping and
importation across borders may be replaced by the electronic trans-
mission of object specification files to end-user 3-D printers at distant
locations. Such decentralized patent infringement may be difficult to
monitor, and even if detected the financial calculus of suing multiple
small firms or individuals may not prove viable. Thus, for certain
types of inventions, current patent incentive structures may no longer
function once 3-D printing technology broadly reduces the Techno-
logical Cost of producing goods.
In sum, we observed some activity that is today being implicitly
constrained by technological limitations: producing complex physical
objects. We observed some functional activity that this implicit con-
straint is performing in a larger patent legal structure: limiting the set
of putative defendants making patent infringement detection and re-
striction operational. We can predict an upcoming issue as the Tech-
nological Cost decreases due to 3-D printing: the inability to monitor
and address infringement in a way that had not historically been prob-
lematic.
Copyright has a very similar economic issue concerning physical
objects. Copyright law grants to creators of sculptures, figurines, and
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other non-functional three-dimensional artistic objects, the exclusive
right to reproduce these objects, and their designs and likenesses.226
The development of such creative works often requires time and re-
sources.227 Creators are often (but not always) incentivized to create
these works only by the knowledge that copyright exclusivity will
allow them to capture the monetary value of these works in the mar-
ket.228 In other words, copyright economics depends upon being able
to prevent others from creating these objects without permission so
that those who want reproductions will have to purchase them from
the creator. The creators of films, for example, often monetize their
investment through the sale of figurines, dolls, or other physical mani-
festations of characters or objects associated with the film.229 Copy-
right law often secures this monetization.
Already, early adopting non-professional owners of 3-D printers
are able to generate, based upon designs, high-quality figurines and
replicas of film characters or objects. In the past only firms with
relatively sophisticated equipment typically produced such prod-
ucts.231 Thus, home printed 3-D reproductions of copyrighted objects
may begin to commercially substitute for purchases that in the past
accrued to the copyright holder. The model thus allows us to predict
that the decentralization of production may make legal actions for
direct copyright infringement less effective for certain types of crea-
tive works by effectively dispersing defendants.
3. Predicting Changes in Law by Applying the Framework
The recognition that current IP laws depends upon high Techno-
logical Cost allows one to make predictions about upcoming changes
in the law. Current IP laws are premised upon the Technological Cost-
liness of producing copyrighted or patented objects. 3-D printing low-
ers the production costs for certain types of objects and allows for
decentralization. When decentralization makes the class of direct in-
fringers unmanageably large, a typical legal response has been an in-
226. 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2012). Copyright holders can also create physical derivative works
(e.g., figurines) based upon book or movie characters. See 17 U.S.C § 106 (2012) (delineat-
ing the exclusive rights to reproduce products).
227. Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 326. ("While the cost of creating a work subject
to copyright protection ... is often high, the cost of reproducing the work ... is often
low.... If the copies made by the creator of the work are priced at ... marginal cost ... the
creator's total revenues may not be sufficient to cover the costs of creating the work.").
228. See generally id.
229. Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics ofLegalizing the Grey Album, 59
ALA. L. REv. 345, 363 (2008) (discussing the value of merchandising based upon derivative
rights of films).
230. Steve Henn, As 3-D Printing Becomes More Accessible, Copyright Questions Arise,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/
02/19/171912826/as-3-d-printing-become-more-accessible-copyright-questions-arise.
231. See ANDERSON, supra note 37, at 68-69.
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creased focus upon secondary (or indirect) infringement liability. In
theories of secondary liability, defendants are liable if they help others
to directly infringe, even if the secondary defendants themselves do
not directly infringe (e.g., produce infringing objects).232
Copyright law has seen similar examples in decentralization be-
fore. New reproduction technologies (e.g., sound recordings and digit-
ization) have enabled the duplication of copyrighted works by private
individuals that had previously required expensive professional
equipment. As Stacey Dogan has observed, a common strategic reac-
tion to such decentralization is to focus secondary liability upon the
firms that provide the equipment or "tools" that enable others to di-
rectly infringe.233 Thus, after home video emerged, copyright holders
sued Sony, the manufacturer of VCR machines (the equipment that
assisted individual infringement), under theories of secondary liability
rather than suing the dispersed set of directly infringing individual
users.234 Similarly, once 3-D printing enables direct infringement by
dispersed and hard-to-detect private individuals, IP holders may shift
their attention to the makers of 3-D printers under theories of second-
ary liability.
The 3-D printing analysis was meant to be illustrative of a more
general approach in which subtle legal dependencies upon high Tech-
nological Cost in IP law can be observed ex ante - before a particu-
lar Technological Cost decreasing innovation emerges widely.235 The
example demonstrates the way in which this Article's framework can
be predictive of current susceptibilities in IP law to Technologically
Induced Shifts in Scope. We can focus upon the Structural Constraints
that exist today, and the way in which they implicitly limit the scope
of certain activities. This, in turn, can illuminate the way in which IP
legal frameworks may depend upon these implicit limitations and al-
lows us to predict, ex ante, the way in which IP structures may be dis-
rupted by future technological change once these constraints dissipate.
232. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 21, at 1347 n.8.
233. Stacey L. Dogan, Code Versus the Common Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
73, 85 (2003).
234. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
235. As discussed earlier, this is not to suggest that we should necessarily replicate the
constraints of the current technological state with law. To do so would be overinclusive, and
would ignore the welfare enhancing benefits unlocked by 3-D printing technology. The
better approach would be to consider ways in which the incentive structure of the existing
system might be preserved going forward. One approach, for example, might be to use
technology to make the class of putative infringers more manageable under the legal sys-
tem - lowering the transaction costs of detecting and enforcing legal rights in a manner
proportional to the diffusion. Others might focus upon alternative economic structures or
taxes to insure that inventors are suitably compensated proportionally to the value of their
inventive contribution, in an era where the production of physical obiects becomes decen-
tralized and dispersed. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use
Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 36-42 (2003).
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B. Technological Cost as a Policy Lever in IP
This Article's framework also reveals a new class of policy levers
based upon Technological Cost. The "policy lever" metaphor was
popularized by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley.236 They used the term to
reference the way in which courts could choose among multiple pa-
tent doctrines, and flexibly apply these doctrines, to contextually take
into account material differences among patents from industries with
different characteristics.237 More generally, it is useful to think of IP
law as containing a broader series of "policy levers" that policymak-
ers can independently calibrate in order to the meet various IP
goals.238 We can think of IP policymakers as having the ability to
elect from among the numerous IP doctrines, processes, or structures
that can be used to achieve policy goals in somewhat different ways.
For instance, if business method patents239 are exceptionally
problematic as a category of invention, one approach might be to cat-
egorically exclude them under the patentable subject matter rule.240
However, there may be other patent policy levers that might be more
fruitfully employed to achieve the same end. For instance, the courts
may combat problematic business method patents more subtly by se-
lectively, but informally applying a lower obviousness standard to
these inventions.241 Or, policymakers might devote resources to in-
creasing the length of patent examination for business method patents.
The major point of the policy lever metaphor is that there are often
multiple strategies by which IP lawmakers can address issues, some
with advantages over others. Policymakers can try "pushing" or "pull-
ing" various policy levers to adaptively meet various policy ends.
If we consider "policy levers" to broadly mean the various ave-
nues by which IP policymakers can address IP problems, this Article's
framework suggests one novel avenue: strategically reducing the
Technological Cost of selected activities. For example, recall from
Part II that patent law's novelty doctrine prohibits the patenting of
236. Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1579. Burk and Lemley primarily discussed this
in the context of courts and flexible judicial doctrines, but we can think of this more broadly
in terms of calibration points throughout IP law.
237. Id.
238. This Article uses the term "policy lever" in this broader sense, and not limited to
court doctrines.
239. A business method patent is a patent on a means of running some aspect of a busi-
ness. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
578-79 (1999).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3235-36 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating for a patentable subject matter based
approach to dealing with problematic patents).
241. See, e.g., DAN BURK & MARK LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 196 (2009).
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inventions that had been invented previously.242 Recall further that, as
a practical matter, the way that a patent examiner actually rejects a
patent as non-novel (e.g., previously invented) is by finding invalidat-
ing prior art documents.243 Many patents are considered problematic
because they should have been rejected by the patent office during
patent examination. However, patent examiners are not always able to
find invalidating prior art documents, given the limited time to search
through an enormous universe of potentially relevant documents. 244
This problem suggests an approach based upon Technological
Cost. The novelty doctrine is dependent on the Technological Cost of
actually finding invalidating prior art documents. It can therefore shift
if the Technological Cost of this activity decreases. Thus, policymak-
ers might devote resources to deliberately reducing the Technological
Cost of finding relevant, invalidating prior art. For example, rather
than changing the novelty doctrine, lawmakers might instead devote
resources developing advanced technological tools that reduce the
Structural Constraints that today inhibit the finding of relevant prior
art. Numerous machine learning and data mining techniques have de-
veloped out of the computer science domain in the last ten years that
can be usefully deployed on this problem.245 Thus a technological
system that automates the process of finding obscure and remote prior
art, incorporating modern search and analytics technologies to im-
prove the capacity to find relevant, invalidating prior art documents in
ways not feasible today, is another avenue to address the issue of in-
valid but issued patents. This is an observation that is highlighted by
viewing the problem through the lens of Technological Cost.
The previous example was meant to be more generally illustrative
as to how an IP policy goal might be achieved by reducing Techno-
logical Cost. Technological Cost provides an additional dimension
that policymakers might consider when addressing policy problems.
Among the pantheon of policy levers, the most promising lever to
address a problematic IP issue might be technological, and not doctri-
nal, in nature. The recognition that IP doctrines depend upon Techno-
logical Cost helps to reveal this strategy, and reduction of
Technological Cost should be considered as an additional tool or lever
in general IP regulatory approaches.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article argued that many observed disruptions in IP law can
be usefully explained through the lens of changing Technological
242. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
243. Id.
244. Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1614 n.124.
245. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra, note 41, at 867.
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Cost. IP laws, or legal frameworks, are often structured upon the un-
stated premise that activities that have historically been infeasible and
difficult to do will continue to be constrained. Emerging technologies
tend to reduce the capacity-limiting effects of Structural Constraints
of the past. When this occurs, positive IP laws can undergo meaning-
ful shifts in Effective Scope or Strength, and long prevailing but im-
plicit equilibria can be disrupted.
Such disruptions are common in IP law, but are often difficult to
characterize. This Article provided the Technological Cost framework
and a vocabulary for describing observed shifts. It also provides a
metric for characterizing the nature of a legal shift following a techno-
logical change. We observe which Structural Constraints had an im-
plicit, scope-limiting effect on activities in the prior technological era,
and we examine to what extent particular IP laws, or overall IP struc-
tures, depended upon this implicit restriction. We can describe the
change by articulating precisely what used to be limited, what impact
this limitation had upon IP law, and how the novel technology under
consideration effectively diminishes the restrictive effect of earlier
Structural Constraints. This Article suggested that this type of argu-
ment should enter broader IP policymaking to understand the nature
of such Technologically Induced Shifts in legal scope.
This Article also provided numerous examples of IP legal frame-
works from across the various IP domains that depended upon the
Technological Costliness of activities in order to preserve balances
that are central to IP policy goals. When technology reduced the costs
of these activities, IP regulatory equilibria shifted as well. This Article
further described a method for revealing unrecognized technological
dependencies in existing IP laws, and applied this method to illustrate
how recognizing technological dependencies ex ante can be used to
predict issues in IP law that are likely to occur with near-term techno-
logical change.
Finally, this Article argued that high Technological Cost can be
understood as implicitly protecting important IP values. Values that
are protected primarily by Technological Cost, and not by positive
law, are vulnerable to erosion as technologies emerge. In such in-
stances, it may not be apparent that costs were functioning to protect
social values until after those costs are gone. This Article discussed
this dynamic of implicit protection by costs, and subsequent Techno-
logical Erosion, in the specific context of IP law. The function of
costs in implicitly maintaining social values may have broader impli-
cations for legal theory generally. These applications are beyond the
scope of this Article but will hopefully be the subject of future inquiry
by other scholars.
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